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Accounting

Although much research on corporate dividend policy exists, the evidence is far from
conclusive. Understanding how dividend taxes affect firm-level decisions is crucial to evaluating
dividend imputation credits which provide shareholder-level tax credits for dividends received or
decreased shareholder-level dividend tax rates, which reduce the double taxation of dividends.
Using changes in New Zealand and Australia’s tax regimes, this dissertation provides new
evidence on the relationship between tax incentives for R&D investment and dividend payment.
The results show that the theory that the tension between R&D investment and dividend payment
decreases when a country previously not offering tax incentives for R&D investment or dividend
payout, implements one, does not hold using New Zealand firms. Further, New Zealand dividendpaying firms with higher marginal tax rates behave in the manner predicted for firms moving
from a tax regime offering a tax incentive for R&D investment to a tax regime offering tax
incentives for both R&D investment and dividend payment. The results using Australian data,
demonstrate that that the tension between R&D investment and dividend payment increases when
a country previously offering only a tax incentives for R&D investment, offers one for both R&D
investment and dividend payment. This result is driven by firms with high marginal tax rates.
These findings demonstrate that the relationship between tax incentives for R&D investment and
dividend payment varies according to firm marginal tax rates and typical dividend payment
policies. It also reiterates the importance of considering firms’ abilities to use R&D tax
incentives, via their marginal tax rates, when contemplating the effects a shareholder-level
dividend tax decrease will have on R&D investment. This dissertation also provides new insight
into the corporate dividend policy views. The results support the double taxation and tax
irrelevance views in dividend-paying firms operating in a tax regime with dividend imputation
and capital gains taxes. By documenting a significant decrease in R&D investment after a change
in dividend taxes, this dissertation also highlights a void in the current corporate dividend policy
views and shows the need for the inclusion of R&D investment.
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Chapter I
Introduction
The role shareholder-level taxes play in corporations’ decisions to pay dividends is still
debated in academic research. Since Black (1976) posed the questions of why corporations pay
dividends given their tax disadvantages and why investors appear to pay attention to them,
researchers have tried to explain corporations’ dividend policies (McKenzie and Thompson 1997,
Miller and Scholes 1978). Poterba and Summers (1985, 1) reiterate Black’s ideas and they
demonstrate that when governments tax corporate profits at the corporate level and again when
they are distributed to shareholders as dividends, corporations should not pay dividends.
Shareholders should prefer that corporations retain earnings where they can continue to be
invested by the corporation and increase the corporation’s value (Poterba and Summers 1985).
Since paying dividends is common among U.S. corporations, corporate dividend policy is
obviously not this straightforward (Poterba 1987, John and Williams 1985, Poterba and Summers
1985).1
Though much research on corporate dividend policy exists, the evidence is far from
conclusive (Blouin et al. 2004, Fama and French 1998, Zodrow 1991, Easterbrook 1984).
Understanding how dividend taxes affect firm-level decisions is crucial to evaluating dividend
imputation credits (McKenzie and Thompson 1997, 465) which provide shareholder-level tax
credits for dividends received or decreased shareholder-level dividend tax rates, which reduce the
double taxation of dividends. Three perspectives on how shareholder-level taxes affect firms’
dividend-paying decisions dominate the literature: the tax irrelevance view, the tax capitalization
(or residual) view, and the double taxation view (McKenzie and Thompson 1997, Zodrow 1991,
Poterba 1987, Poterba and Summers 1985). These three views differ as to why corporations pay

1

The number of firms paying dividends has actually decreased by over 50 percent during the last two
decades while the number of listed firms has increased (Fama and French 2001, 11).

dividends, how dividend taxes at the shareholder-level affect dividend payment, and what
changes in shareholder-level dividend tax policy mean for corporate investment.2
The tax irrelevance view states that shareholder-level taxes are irrelevant in the
corporation’s decision to pay dividends because marginal investors do not demand greater pre-tax
returns from dividend-paying corporations (Miller and Scholes 1978, Miller and Modigliani
1961). That is, shareholders do not expect the corporation to bear the economic burden of the
shareholder-level dividend tax by requiring a greater pre-tax return such that they receive a
minimum desired after-tax return. According to this view, a change in shareholder-level dividend
taxes would not alter corporate distribution decisions (Poterba and Summers 1985, 13).
The tax capitalization view, also known as the residual view, states that the market value
of a corporation’s assets incorporates the present value of expected dividends net of their taxes
(Auerbach 1979, King 1977). Thus, future taxes on expected dividends are capitalized into price,
reducing share prices. This view assumes corporations use retained earnings to finance marginal
corporate investments.3 Corporations only pay dividends when they have cash remaining after
satisfying all other obligations and making all corporate investment decisions. Further, they pay
dividends when an alternative tax-advantaged method of distributing the income (sometimes
referred to as “trapped equity”) does not exist (Zodrow 1991, Auerbach 1979, King 1977).
According to this view, a decrease in shareholder-level dividend taxes increases the stock price
but does not alter corporate investment decisions or dividend payments (Poterba and Summers
1985, 17, McKenzie and Thompson 1997, 464).
The third view, the double taxation perspective, contends that despite dividends’ tax
disadvantage, the market rewards corporations for paying dividends by increasing corporate value
(stock price). Proponents of this view do not claim to know the reason for the reward, but simply

2

Each dividend tax policy view is reviewed in detail in Chapter 2, Section 2.
Throughout this paper, the term “corporate investment” includes both plant, property, and equipment and
R&D investment. “Capital investment” refers only to plant, property, and equipment; it does not include
R&D investment.
3

2

accept that the market rewards corporations for paying dividends (Poterba and Summers 1985,
McClure 1977). According to this view, a decrease in the taxation of dividends reduces a
corporation’s cost of equity capital because it reduces the corporation’s cost of receiving the
market’s reward for paying dividends—an increase in stock price. This reduction in the corporate
cost of equity capital increases the dividend payment.
The tax irrelevance and tax capitalization views hold that dividend taxes do not impact
corporate dividend policy and thus, do not directly affect dividend payments. The tax irrelevance
view predicts that pre-tax dividend payments will not change after implementing a dividend
imputation credit. Thus, a decrease in dividend taxes will not increase the shareholder’s pre-tax
dividend income. The tax capitalization view predicts that any change in the pre-tax dividend
payment will result from a change in the corporation’s profitable alternatives to dividend
payments, not changes to the shareholder-level dividend tax rate.
Only the double taxation view predicts that dividend payments will increase as a direct
result of a decrease in shareholder-level dividend tax rates. Since shareholders will not have to
pay as much tax on the dividends they receive, the corporation’s marginal cost of paying
dividends (and, thus, increasing its stock price) declines further, reducing the cost of equity
capital. In summary, decreasing the taxation of dividends lowers the corporation’s cost of capital,
increasing capital investment and rates of return, which increases dividend payment (Zodrow
1991, 503, Poterba and Summers 1985, 21).
Blouin et al. (2004) find evidence that immediately following The Job and Growth Tax
Relief Act of 2003 (henceforth 2003 Act), which reduced the tax shareholders pay on dividend
income, the payment of dividends increased.4 Using the quarters surrounding the enactment of the
2003 Act, Blouin et al. (2004) document a significant increase in dividends. However, they do not
4

Prior to 2003, dividends that individuals received were taxed at ordinary income tax rates as high as 38.6
percent. Beginning in 2003, dividends that individuals receive from domestic corporations and qualified
foreign corporations are taxed at only five percent if the individuals are in the two lowest tax brackets and
15 percent otherwise (Grace 2003).

3

find support for their hypothesis that the portion of a firm’s shareholders consisting of individuals
(i.e., shareholders that the 2003 Act directly affected) influenced the dividend payment. Without
this support and given overall economic improvements occurring during their study, they are
“hesitant to conclude that tax rates cut caused dividends to increase” (Blouin et al. 2004, 4). The
report from the Treasury’s Office of Economic Policy also shows that 134 previously nondividend-paying companies paid dividends in 2003 after President Bush signed the new
legislation (Treasury Office of Economic Policy 2003).
Blouin et al. (2004) also document a decrease in the number of share repurchases after
the 2003 Act. While their model does not control for uses of funds other than dividends and share
repurchases, prior research documents that a decrease in shareholder-level dividend taxes
increases capital investment. The decrease in shareholder-level dividend taxes lowers firms’
average cost of capital by encouraging equity versus debt financing. This reduction in the cost of
capital leads to an increase in capital investment (Dhaliwal et al. 2003, Black et al. 2000,
Cummins et al. 1994, Auerbach and Hassett 1991, Jorgenson 1963). However, according to
Partington’s funds-flow identity (1985), sources of funds must equal uses of funds. In other
words, managers can only allocate resources that are actually available. Assuming resources are
fixed, this implies that following a shareholder-level dividend tax decrease, the increases in the
capital investment and dividend payment would have to be funded by either the decrease in the
average cost of capital or the decrease in share repurchases. Otherwise current and prior years’
earnings and funds previously allocated to R&D investments would be needed to help offset
increases in capital investment and dividend payment.
Though inconclusive, two prior studies suggest that shareholder-level dividend tax credits
also lead to decreases in R&D investment (Thomas et al. 2003, Black et al. 2000). The idea that
investment in R&D may decrease as a result of shareholder-level dividend tax credits is
concerning since evidence has shown that domestic R&D spending is linked to both the rate of
innovation and the ability to learn from others (Cameron, 1996; Salter and Martin, 2001). Black

4

et al. (2000) investigate the effect the implementation of dividend imputation credits in Australia
and New Zealand had on capital investment, hypothesizing an increase in capital investment after
dividend imputation.5 They initially define their dependent variable, capital investment, as the
change in the sum of plant, property, and equipment and annual R&D expenditures and then as
the change in each separate component.6 Their independent variable for dividend payment is the
dividend payout ratio which represents the ratio of cash dividends to net earnings, controlling for
variations in dividend payments due to corporate earnings.
When Black et al. (2000) use Australian data and run an ordinary least squares regression
with the dependent variable defined as just annual R&D expense, their initial significant positive
result between the change in the sum of plant, property, and equipment and annual R&D
expenditures and the existence of a dividend imputation credit becomes significantly negative.
This significant negative relationship suggests that, after Australia implemented the dividend
imputation credit in 1988, R&D investment declined despite the fact that Australia also offered an
incentive for R&D investment. Interestingly, the relationship between R&D expenditures and the
dividend payout ratio before and after the existence of dividend imputation credits is
insignificant. Further the entire model becomes insignificant when they run the regression using
New Zealand data. Due to insignificant relationships between capital investment (defined as
plant, property, and equipment and R&D investment) and the dividend payout ratio throughout
the tax change, Black et al. (2000) concluded that dividend imputation credits did not affect
dividend payout ratios. This finding conflicts with the Blouin et al. (2004) U.S. study which
concluded that reduced shareholder-level dividend tax rates increase dividend payments (Blouin
et al. 2004).

5

Again, dividend imputation credits decrease the double taxation of dividends by providing shareholders
dividend tax credits for taxes the corporation pays.
6
Their use of “capital investment” differs from this paper, which defines corporate investment as both
plant, property, and equipment and R&D investment and capital investment as only plant, property, and
equipment.

5

Since Black et al. (2000) focus on changes in capital investment (rather than the
relationship between R&D investment and dividend payment), they run an OLS regression with
capital investment as the dependent variable and the dividend payout ratio as an independent
variable. Prior research suggests that R&D investment and dividend payment are determined in
conjunction with each other (Partington 1985). When a dependent variable (corporate investment)
is decided in conjunction with an independent variable (dividend payment), simultaneous
equations should be used to correct for the correlation between the independent variable and the
error term (Wooldridge 2002, Johnston and DiNardo 1997). Thus, the OLS regression Black et al.
(2000) used would not correct for the correlation between the dividend payout ratio and the error
term, and simultaneous equations should be used to assess the relationship between R&D expense
and dividend payment.
Thomas et al. (2003) use simultaneous equations to analyze the relationship between
R&D expense and dividend payment. They investigate three different tax regimes which vary in
the tax incentives they provide for paying dividends and investment in R&D.7 The first regime,
consisting of the United Kingdom and Germany, provides incentives for paying dividends but not
investing in R&D. In the second and third regimes, France and Canada provide incentives for
paying dividends and investing in R&D, and the United States and Japan provide incentives for
investing in R&D but not paying dividends. Thomas et al. (2003) find that the negative
relationship between R&D expense and dividend payment is stronger, indicating greater tension,
in tax regimes providing incentives for both R&D investment and dividend payments than in tax
regimes permitting only one of the incentives. One way to interpret this result is that firms
operating in countries offering incentives for both R&D investments and dividend payment have
more difficulty allocating funds to one over the other, creating a stronger negative relationship
between the two.
7

In these tax regimes, Thomas et al. (2003) do not classify countries with only a 100 percent R&D
deduction as offering incentives for investment in R&D. This is consistent with the R&D literature.
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However, contrary to Berger (1993), Brown (1985) and Eisner and Sullivan (1984),
Thomas et al. (2003) do not find their theorized positive relationship between R&D incentives
and R&D investment. If R&D incentives motivate R&D investment, the R&D incentive should
be positively related to the amount invested in R&D. They argue that their “cross-country
research design incorporating dividends as well as investment finds that the relation is more
complex than previously understood in countries whose firms are responding to both R&D credits
and imputation credits” (p. 49). The lack of support could indicate a problem in the model they
tested. Prior research has indicated that different countries’ R&D tax incentives vary in the
amount of credit they provide to corporations within their regime and that it is important to
consider a firm’s ability to use R&D tax incentives (Billings et al. 1994, Berger 1993, Eisner and
Sullivan 1984).8 Thomas et al. (2003) do not control for the magnitude of the R&D incentive nor
the firm’s current tax position.
Using simultaneous equations and controlling for both the amount of R&D tax incentive
offered in two similar countries and the ability of corporations to use the R&D tax incentive, this
paper performs an event study to investigate the role R&D tax incentives and dividend imputation
credits play in the dividend tax puzzle. Analyzing tax changes within two different but similar
countries, Australia and New Zealand, this study controls for the benefit the R&D tax incentive
provides the firm by including marginal tax rates. The marginal tax rate (henceforth MTR) is the
rate that would be used to calculate the additional tax liability resulting from one additional dollar
of income. Unlike many event studies in tax research, the tax changes in Australia and New
Zealand included few significant tax reforms, allowing for a relatively clean experimental design.
In July of 1985 Australia implemented an R&D investment tax incentive, creating a setting in
which to investigate the effect of moving from a tax regime offering neither tax incentives for
R&D investment nor dividend payment to offering only a tax incentive for R&D investment.

8

For example, investment tax credits or foreign tax credits may lower the tax liability such that it is too
small to fully use the R&D credit (Billings et al. 1994, 21).

7

During the late 1980s, both Australia and New Zealand began offering dividend imputation
credits. Since at the time of dividend imputation, the two countries treat R&D investment
differently, comparing their responses to the dividend tax changes provides new evidence on (1)
the relationship between R&D investment incentives and dividend payment incentives and (2)
dividend tax policy views.
I find that when moving from a tax regime offering tax incentives for neither R&D
investment nor dividend payout to one offering a tax incentive for R&D investment, firms do not
exhibit the weaker inverse relationship between R&D expense and dividend payment predicted in
Thomas et al. (2003).9 Further, firms do not exhibit their predicted decrease in the negative
relationship between R&D expense and dividend payment when moving from a tax regime
offering tax incentives for neither R&D investment nor dividend payout to one offering a tax
incentive for dividend payment. Contrary to Thomas et al.’s (2003) prediction, I find that
dividend-paying firms with higher MTRs actually experience an increase in the negativity of the
relationship between R&D investment and dividend payout when they move from a tax regime
offering tax incentives for neither R&D investment nor dividend payout, to one offering a tax
incentive for dividend payment. This relationship between R&D expenses and dividend payment
does not change in firms with lower MTRs, after dividend imputation.
This finding has three implications for the literature. First, it demonstrates the importance
of factoring a firm’s tax status into models investigating tax changes. Second, it demonstrates the
importance of factoring a firm’s typical dividend payment policy into these models. Third, it
highlights a potential oversight in much of the literature evaluating the effectiveness of R&D tax
incentives—the potential for 100 percent deductibility of R&D to act as an incentive for R&D
investment. I find that when dividend imputation is implemented, dividend-paying firms with
higher MTRs, receiving only 100 percent deductibility for R&D investment, react in a manner

9

The terminology “weaker inverse relationship” means a decrease in the inverse or negative relationship.
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similar to firms operating under a tax regime offering an additional tax incentive for R&D
investment.
I also confirm Thomas et al.’s (2003) finding that the relationship between R&D
expenses and dividend payout is stronger (more negative) in dividend-paying firms operating in a
tax regime offering a tax incentive for both R&D investment and dividend payment than in a tax
regime offering a tax incentive for only R&D investment. I demonstrate this by documenting an
increase in the negativity of the relationship between R&D investment and dividend payment as
firms actually move from a tax regime offering only an R&D incentive to one offering a tax
incentive for both R&D investment and dividend payment. Further, I demonstrate that this
finding is driven by firms with higher MTRs.
This improved understanding of the relationship between R&D expense, dividend
payment, and firm MTRs provides policymakers with more insight as to how different firms
operating within a country will react to changes in the tax incentives for R&D investment and
dividend payments. Further, the documented decrease in R&D investment following the
implementation of dividend imputation in a tax regime not offering an R&D tax incentive
reiterates the potential for changes in shareholder-level dividend taxes to alter other uses of
corporate funds.
The three views of corporate dividend policy, the tax irrelevance view, the tax
capitalization view and the double taxation view, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. They
could each hold true for certain corporations under certain conditions (Poterba and Summers
1985, 2). My research design allows me to (1) separate firms that, before the tax change, typically
paid dividends from those which did not and (2) separate firms in a tax position to use an R&D
incentive from those not in such a position. I then analyze each group’s reaction to the dividend
imputation credit to determine which corporate dividend policy view they follow.
I find that for dividend-paying firms operating under a tax regime which offers dividend
imputation but taxes capital gains, the double taxation and tax irrelevant views of corporate

9

dividend policy are most descriptive. I also find significant decreases in R&D investment when a
tax regime not offering tax incentives for dividend payment or R&D investment implements a tax
incentive for dividend payments. Current dividend policy views do not include R&D investment
in their predictions and researchers tend to add it to capital investment to determine a firm’s
overall investment. This paper documents a negative relationship between the two and
demonstrates the importance of looking at R&D investment separate from capital investment.
This paper proceeds by further explaining the settings in New Zealand and Australia
which provide the data used to address the research questions. Chapter II also reviews each of the
three corporate dividend policy views. Chapter III provides a literature review of the three
corporate dividend policy views, demonstrating that the evidence is inconclusive. Since the paper
also investigates the relationship between shareholder-level dividend taxes and R&D corporatelevel taxes, Chapter III includes a review of reactions to changes in R&D corporate-level taxes
and research indicating a relationship among dividends, investment, and their respective taxes.
Chapter IV provides the theory behind the model used in the empirical analysis. Chapter V
develops the hypotheses, and Chapter VI discusses the data and presents the model. Chapter VII
presents the results of the empirical analysis, and Chapter VIII discusses the implications of the
paper and its findings.

10

Chapter II
Country Settings and Corporate Dividend Policy Views
Country Settings
Effective July of 1985, Australia permitted companies to deduct 150 percent of their
R&D cost if the total annual R&D expenditure was greater that 20,000 Australian dollars, and
they registered with the Industry Research and Development Board. This board strictly monitored
R&D eligibility (Parliament of Australia: Senate Committee Report on Business Taxation
Reform, chapter 7, paragraph 1). As shown in Table 1, Panel A, prior to July of 1985, firms were
permitted to deduct 100 percent of R&D.10 In July of 1987, Australia implemented a dividend
imputation credit in the form of a dividend tax credit.11 The dividend tax credit enabled
shareholders to receive a credit known as a “franking credit” for the portion of dividends paid out
of a company’s after-tax profit or “franked dividends” (Petty et al. 2000, 30).12 Thus,
shareholders calculated their imputed credit on fully-franked dividends as follows:

Imputation Credit =

Dividends * Company tax rate
1 - Company tax rate

Shareholders report the amount of the “franked dividend” they receive plus the imputation credit
in their gross incomes (where the addition of the imputation credit “grosses up” the dividend
received to a before-tax amount). They then claim the imputation credit against their tax liability
(Petty et al. 2000, 31). For example, in 1988 when the maximum corporate and individual tax
rates were both 48 percent, without dividend imputation, an Australian individual receiving a
dividend of $100 from an Australian corporation in the 48 percent tax bracket would have
reported $100 in gross income and been liable for $48.00 in taxes. However, with dividend
imputation, the individual reported not only the $100 in gross income but also the $92.31
10

Australia operates on a July-June tax year instead of a calendar year.
Again, dividend imputation credits reduce the double taxation of dividends by providing shareholderlevel tax credits for dividends received or decreased shareholder-level dividend tax rates.
12
Australia refers to its imputation credit as a franking credit. To be consistent with the terminology in the
literature, this paper continues to refer to it as an imputation credit.
11
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imputation credit, calculated according to the above equation. The resulting $192.31 total
increase in gross income, increased the individual shareholder’s tax before credits by $92.31 (i.e.
$192.31 times 48 percent individual tax rate). This $92.31 tax liability is fully offset when the
$92.31 imputation credit is applied against it. Thus, the individual effectively received the $100
dividend from the corporation free of additional tax.
As summarized in Panel B of Table 1, Australia also added an individual-level capital
gains tax in July 1987. Prior to this date, individuals only paid tax on the gain from selling shares
if they held the shares less than 12 months. Since July 1987, when individuals hold shares over
one year, they pay tax on the difference between the sale price and the shares’ cost, indexed for
inflation. They then include this gain in gross income where it is taxed at regular rates. However,
shareholders no longer pay tax on fully-franked dividends they receive while holding the stock
(Thomas and Sellers 1994, 87).
Prior to April of 1988, New Zealand taxed individual residents’ worldwide taxable
incomes, including dividends, at a three-rate scale of 15, 30, and 48 percent (Cameron 1996). In
April of 1988, the three-rate scale on individual residents’ worldwide incomes was reduced to a
two-rate scale of 24 and 34 percent.13 As Panel C of Table 1 shows, corporate rates also fell from
48 to 33 percent (Brash, 1996). At this time, New Zealand also implemented a dividend
imputation credit (Prevost et al. 2002, 1100).
Similar to Australia’s dividend imputation credit, New Zealand residents include
dividends received plus the corporate tax on these dividends (i.e. gross-up amount) in gross
income. They then offset their individual tax liabilities with the tax the corporation has already
paid, i.e. imputation credit (Prevost et al. 2002, 1081). Prior to 1988, New Zealand permitted
corporations a 100 percent deduction for R&D expenditures. While the tax changes in 1988 did
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New Zealand operates on an April-March tax year instead of a calendar year.
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not alter the R&D deduction, the 15 percent reduction in the maximum corporate tax rate reduced
the value of deducting R&D expenditures (Brash, 1996).14
The settings in Australia and New Zealand provide unique opportunities in which to test
the relationship between R&D investment and dividend payment. Australia went from a tax
regime without tax incentives for R&D investment or dividend payment to a tax regime with a tax
incentive only for R&D investment and then to a tax regime with tax incentives for both R&D
investment and dividend payment. New Zealand went from a tax regime without tax incentives
for R&D investment or dividend payment to a tax regime offering a tax incentive for dividend
payments.15
Corporate Dividend Policy Views
The three views explaining why corporations pay dividends, the tax irrelevance view, the
tax capitalization view and the double taxation view, differ in the calculation of the corporation’s
cost of capital and the components included in this calculation. This difference leads to varying
predictions in the event of a change in shareholder-level dividend taxes. This section reviews
each corporate dividend policy view’s calculation of corporate cost of capital and prediction of
alterations in behavior following a change in shareholder-level dividend taxes.
Tax Irrelevance View
In the tax irrelevance view investors do not demand that corporations pay greater returns
on equity instruments when shareholder-level dividend tax rates or capital gains tax rates
decrease. Instead investors with similar tax characteristics form tax clienteles. For example,
individuals or institutions with low shareholder-level dividend tax rates (or MTRs) hold stocks
with high dividend payments. Likewise investors facing high shareholder-level dividend tax rates
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For example consider a firm with an income of $20,000 before their R&D expense of $1,000. Prior to the
tax change the firm would save $480 ($1,000 * .48) in taxes via the R&D deduction; after the tax change
the same amount of R&D expense, $1,000, would only save the firm $330 ($1,000 * .33) in taxes.
15
New Zealand did continue its 100 percent deduction of R&D. However, Thomas et al. (2003) did not
classify countries with only a 100 percent R&D deduction as ones offering incentives for investment in
R&D. For comparability, I use the same classification approach.
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will hold stocks with low dividend payments. Due to uncertainty, investors also hold some stock
inconsistent with their tax-preferred dividend payment for diversification. Thus, a “marginal
investor clientele” forms which is indifferent between receiving dividends or capital gains.16
Further, as clarified below, the effective shareholder-level dividend tax rate and capital gains tax
rate of these marginal investors is zero (Poterba and Summers 1985, Miller and Scholes 1978,
Miller and Modigliani 1961).
Miller and Scholes (1978), proponents of this view, argue that all personal taxes can be
effectively laundered. For example, a marginal investor who is selling stock at a loss will also sell
stock with a gain, bringing his effective capital gains rate to zero. Further, a marginal investor
consisting of a pension fund, university, or charity pays no tax and, thus, has a zero tax rate on
both shareholder-level dividends and capital gains. Since the effective shareholder-level dividend
and capital gains tax rates for the marginal investor are zero, the return to the marginal investor
for one dollar initially invested is the return on the investment after corporate-level taxes. Neither
the shareholder-level dividend tax rate nor the capital gains tax rate factor into the corporation’s
cost of equity capital. Since a permanent change in shareholder-level dividend taxes or capital
gains taxes will not result in a change in the corporate cost of equity, corporate investments and
dividend payment policies will not change.
Tax Capitalization View
The tax capitalization view states that shareholder-level dividend taxes are an additional
tax on corporations’ profits, and thus shareholders capitalize future dividend taxes into share
values (Auerbach 1979, King 1977). Corporations only pay dividends when they have cash
remaining after paying all other obligations and it is the only method for them to distribute this
trapped equity. Since an alternative tax-advantaged method of distributing the income does not
exist, corporations finance dividends with this remaining or residual cash. In other words,
16

The marginal investor is the investor who determines the market price of the securities under
consideration. Under the tax irrelevance view this is the investor whose marginal tax rates on dividends and
capital gains are virtually equal (Poterba and Summers 1985, 11).
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dividends do not signal the market; they merely return trapped equity to stockholders (McKenzie
and Thompson 1997, Zodrow 1991, Poterba and Summers 1985).
These firms continue to use retained earnings for corporate investment until investors are
indifferent between reinvesting within the firm and receiving additional dividends. Not paying
dividends defers the tax on the corporation’s earnings from the original investment and causes
stock price appreciation. This tax deferral offsets the later shareholder-level dividend tax (Zodrow
1991, 500, Poterba and Summers 1985, 15). In other words, the after-tax appreciation of the stock
equals the after-tax value of foregone dividends. For instance, if a corporation uses one dollar for
new investment, instead of paying one dollar in dividends, the shareholder does not have to pay
the shareholder-level dividend tax and thus saves an amount equal to the shareholder-level
dividend tax rate. However, the reinvested one dollar will increase the stock price causing the
shareholder to pay a capital gains tax.17 In equilibrium, the cost to the shareholder of the
corporation investing one dollar instead of paying one dollar in dividends equals the value of the
new investment, qN, which is reflected in the stock price as follows:

q N = (1 − Shareholder - Level Dividend Tax Rate) + (Capital Gains Tax Rate)(q N )

(1)

where (1- Shareholder-Level Dividend Tax Rate) is the after-tax dividend the shareholder would
have received if the corporation had paid dividends and (Capital Gains Tax Rate)( qN) is the
capital gains tax the shareholder pays as a result of the increase in stock price the new corporate
investment causes. Rewriting equation (1) in terms of the value of the corporate-level investment
of one dollar in equilibrium results in the following:
qN =

1 − Shareholder - Level Dividend Tax Rate
1 − Capital Gains Tax Rate
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For the sake of simplicity, this discussion assumes that capital gains taxes are paid annually as they
accrue. This is similar to Australia’s capital gains taxes.
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(2)

Whether the corporation pays a dollar of dividends or uses it for corporate investment, the value
to the shareholder of each initial dollar invested in the company is the same, and thus dividend tax
policy plays a role in the value of the corporation but does not influence corporate investment.
To demonstrate this, consider two scenarios, one in which the corporation pays dividends
and one in which it foregoes paying dividends for corporate investment. In both cases the
individual initially owns 50 shares of stock, each valued at $1.40, giving him a total stock value
of $70. The shareholder-level dividend tax rate is 46 percent, and the capital gains tax rate is 10
percent.
Scenario A: The corporation pays a cash dividend of $1 per share.

Since the dividend is paid and not used for corporate reinvestment, the value of the stock does not
change. The individual pays $23 in shareholder-level dividend taxes [($1 dividend per share) (50
shares) (0.46 dividend tax rate)], receives $27 after shareholder-level dividend taxes [($1
dividend per share) (50 shares) – $23 shareholder-level dividend tax], and holds a total of $70
worth of stock.
Scenario B: Instead of paying the $100 dividend, the corporation uses it for new investment.

In accordance with equation (2), the corporate investment will cause the stock price to increase by
$0.60 per share [($1 foregone dividend) (1 – 0.46 shareholder-level dividend tax rate) / (1 – 0.10
capital gains tax rate)]. The individual will pay a capital gains tax of $3 [($0.60 share price
increase) (50 shares) (0.10 capital gains tax rate)]. The individual now owns 50 shares worth $2
each ($1.40 original stock price + $0.60 increase in stock price), for a total stock value of $100.
Now, suppose, the individual decides to sell stock equal to his overall stock value increase of $30
[($0.60 increase in stock price)(50 shares)]. Since his shares each have a value of $2, he sells 15
shares. This leaves him with $70 worth of stock [($2 per share) (50 initial shares – 15 sold
shares)]. The total value of the stock, $70 is now the same as it was in Scenario A when the
corporation paid a $1 dividend instead of investing it. Further, the total amount the shareholder
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has received is $27 [($30 from stock sale) – ($3 capital gains tax)], the same amount received in
Scenario A.
To summarize the total distribution the individual in Scenario A receives is $27 ($1
dividend * 50 shares - $1 * 50 shares * 0.46 shareholder-level dividend tax rate) which equals the
total distribution the individual in Scenario B receives after selling the portion of stock equal to
the capital gain:

 (1 − 0.46 Shareholder - LevelDividendTax Rate)

 * 50shares- $3CapitalGainsTax = $27
(1 − 0.1 CapitalGainsTax Rate)


Now suppose that instead of selling the 15 shares in Scenario B, the individual continues to hold
all 50 shares and the corporation pays as dividends all after-corporate-level tax returns from the
new capital investment. The individual will receive the return on the investment, less corporate
tax and shareholder-level dividends taxes. The individual will be content with this after-tax return
as long as it is greater than or equal to the initial cost of each dollar of investment, qN , as defined
in equations (1) and (2). Each period the individual’s after-tax return will be determined by the
rate of return of the new corporate investment, the corporate tax rate and the shareholder-level
dividend tax rate. Again, the individual will expect this after-tax return to equal the initial cost of
the investment, qN, leading to the following equation:
qN =

1 − Shareholder - Level Dividend Tax Rate
=
1 - Capital Gains Tax Rate

Before - Tax Rate of Return * (1 − Corporate Tax Rate) * (1 - Shareholder - Level Dividend Tax Rate)

As you can see, the shareholder-level dividend taxes in equation (3) cancel out, demonstrating
that the level of corporate investment is influenced only by corporate tax rates and capital gains
tax rates. Rewriting equation (3) reveals that the value to the individual of the return per initial
dollar invested is as follows:
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(3)

(4)

q N = (Before - Tax Rate of Return)(1− CorporateTax Rate)(1− Captial Gains Tax Rate)
Thus, while a permanent change in shareholder-level dividend tax rates will increase the price of
the stock, unless coupled with a change in capital gains tax rates, it will not result in a change in
corporate investments or dividend payment policies (Poterba and Summers 1985).
Double Taxation View
Similar to tax capitalization view, the double taxation view contends that shareholderlevel dividend taxes are an additional tax on corporate profits. The shareholder’s after-tax return
is calculated in equation (5):
Shareholder-Level After Tax Return = [(Before Tax Rate of Return) (1 - Corporate Tax

(5)

Rate)] *
[(Dividend Payment Rate) (1 – Shareholder-Level Dividend Tax
Rate) +
(1 – Dividend Payment Rate)(Capital Gains Rate)]
The twist is that the double taxation view holds that despite their tax disadvantage,
shareholders reward corporations when they pay dividends by increasing the stock price. Note
that this differs from the tax capitalization view that stock prices rise when corporations reinvest
instead of paying dividends. Proponents of the double taxation view do not claim to know the
reason for the increase in stock price but simply accept that the market rewards corporations
when they pay dividends (Poterba and Summers 1985, McClure 1977). Therefore, as shown
below in equation (6), the shareholder’s required rate of return (corporations’ cost of capital)
depends on corporate taxes and the weighted average of shareholder-level dividend and capital
gains taxes:
Shareholder-Level After Tax Return = [(Before Tax Rate of Return) (1 - Corporate Tax
Rate)] *
[(w)(Dividend Payment Rate) (1 – Shareholder-Level Dividend Tax
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(6)

Rate)
+ (1 – w) (1 – Dividend Payment Rate)(Capital Gains Rate)]
Where (w) is the weight shareholders place on dividend taxes, which depends on the dividend
payout ratio. When dividend payout ratios are high, shareholders place less weight on
shareholder-level dividend taxes (w) and more weight on capital gain taxes (1- w). This reduces
the weighted average tax rate of dividends and capital gains and the shareholder’s required rate of
return. This lower weighted average tax rate of dividends and capital gains entices firms to pay
dividends despite their tax disadvantages (Zodrow 1991, Poterba and Summers 1985). A decrease
in shareholder-level dividend taxes decreases the amount corporations have to pay for the
shareholder’s after-tax dividend to remain constant. In other words the decrease in shareholderlevel dividend taxes reduces the cost of paying dividends and receiving the increase in stock
price. This motivates the corporation to increase the dividend payout ratio, decreasing the
weighted average tax rate of dividends and capital gains and increasing investment (Zodrow
1991, Poterba and Summers 1985).
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Chapter III
Prior Research

This literature review first discusses prior research on the three corporate dividend policy
views. Evidence both supporting and refuting each view exists. I also include research explaining
potential changes in shareholder-level dividend taxes and a review of the reactions each corporate
dividend policy view predicts. Since this paper also investigates the relationship between
shareholder-level dividend taxes and R&D corporate-level taxes, I include a review of potential
changes in R&D corporate-level taxes and documented reactions to such changes. Lastly, I
review the research suggesting a relationship among dividends, investment, and their respective
taxes.
Corporate Dividend Policy Views

The first of the three views corporate dividend policy views is the tax irrelevance view.
Under this view, a corporation’s decision to invest is independent of its decision to pay dividends
(Miller and Modigliani 1961). Thus, changing the way a country taxes dividends would not
change the firms’ dividend payments, capital investments, or stock prices (Poterba and Summers
1985). Miller and Scholes (1978) warn that many studies rely on short-term responses to
dividends when testing the relationship between taxes and dividend yield or the relationship
between taxes and rate of return. As a result, findings that do not support the tax irrelevance view
often are suspect. They demonstrate that dividend announcement effects, which also increase
rates of return in the short run, bias these studies by creating short-term price increases.
The tax irrelevance view assumes operation in perfect capital markets; everyone in the
market has the same expectations of future earnings and amount of risk involved. In other words,
everyone participating in the market has the same information set (Mougoue and Mukherjee
1994). But, researchers have found evidence that managers have superior information regarding
their corporations. Since information asymmetry exists, dividends provide a signal to the market
(Bhattacharya 1979 and Ross 1977). Ross (1977) uses Spence’s signaling model (1974) to
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investigate the risk investors assume and corporate debt-equity choices. Bhattacharya (1979)
expands Ross’ model (1977) by including the tax-based cost of paying dividends. He finds that in
an imperfect market, cash dividends provide a signal of expected firm cash flows.
Woolridge and Ghosh (1988, 1991) find that corporations do not like to reduce dividend
payments. Thus, they will only pay dividends when they feel confident that they can continue to
do so. When they announce a dividend, they signal the market that they are not only in a financial
position to pay dividends but will continue to pay dividends of the same magnitude in the future.
John and Williams (1985) develop a model where only dividends are taxed. They demonstrate
that shareholders’ needs to receive cash, drive the payment of dividends. In their opinion, this
explains why firms either pay dividends instead of repurchasing shares or pay dividends while
simultaneously selling new shares.
The tax irrelevance view also assumes transaction costs and taxes do not exist (Mougoue
and Mukherjee 1994). However, Easterbrook (1984) contends that not only do taxation costs exist
but agency costs also influence dividend payments. Managers are imperfect agents of investors,
and paying dividends helps to restrict their discretion. Easterbrook builds on Jensen and
Meckling’s theory (1976) that agency costs exist as a result of debt and outside equity.
Continuously paying dividends encourages managers to raise new money. Further, even if paying
dividends does not force managers to raise new money, dividends increase the debt-equity ratio.
Paying dividends versus increasing retained earnings decreases bondholder’s wealth by lowering
the security the bond provides. This explains why dividends please shareholders (Easterbrook
1984).
The second corporate dividend policy view, the tax capitalization view states that despite
the fact that shareholder-level dividend taxes are an additional tax on corporations’ profits,
shareholders capitalize future dividend taxes into share values. Thus dividend taxes do not impact
marginal corporate investment decisions (Auerbach 1979, King 1977, Zodrow 1991). The aftertax appreciation of the stock equals the after-tax value of foregone dividends. Thus, a permanent
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change in dividend taxation, unless coupled with a change in capital gains taxation, will not result
in a change in corporate investments or dividend policies (Poterba and Summers 1985, 15,
Zodrow 1991, 500).
Looking at the financing choices of corporations, Masulis (1980) finds that stock prices
increase when corporations exchange debt for equity and decrease when corporations exchange
equity for debt. In his opinion, this supports the tax capitalization view: when debt replaces
equity, stock prices increase because they now incorporate future dividends into the price.
Contrary to Masulis’ study (1980), Myers-Majluf’s theory (1984) predicts the opposite:
corporations tend to issue equity when their shares are over-valued. Consistently, Masulis and
Korwar (1986) and Vermaelen (1981) find that new stock issues lower stock prices while
repurchases raise stock prices.
Elton and Gruber (1970) argue in favor of the tax capitalization view by showing that
stock prices fall on ex-dividend days. The stock price falls because the dividend is no longer
included in the stock price. Further, the decrease in the stock price is less than the dividend
amount due to the difference in shareholder-level dividend tax rates and capital gains tax rates.
According to Elton and Gruber, this result demonstrates that individual-level taxes make
dividends less attractive than capital gains. Eades et al. (1984) refute this finding by
demonstrating that stock dividends, which are not subject to a shareholder-level tax, produce
similar results in the stock prices on ex-dividend dates.
By estimating firms’ implied cost of capital, Dhaliwal et al. (2005) find that firms
operating under classical tax systems (double taxation of corporate profits), with high institutional
ownership pay lower dividend premiums than firms with low institutional ownership. This
dividend premium is the additional amount a firm must pay in dividends such that the dividends
meet non-institutional shareholders’ after-tax required rates of return and supports the tax
capitalization view. In their setting, the dividend tax penalty is the difference between the
dividend and capital gains tax.
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Altering the Ohlson model (1995) to incorporate shareholder-level dividend taxes, Harris
and Kemsley (1999) find support for dividend tax capitalization. They separate book value into
retained earnings and contributed capital. Retained earnings proxies for earnings and profits,
which is the portion of book value subject to dividend tax since non-liquidating distributions are
taxed as dividends to the extent of earnings and profits and then as a tax-free return of capital.
They find that the weight placed on earnings increases while the weight placed on contributed
capital decreases as the ratio of retained earnings to contributed capital increases. Harris and
Kemsley claim that this supports dividend tax capitalization: as the ratio of retained earnings to
contributed capital increases, the amount of dividend taxes to which shareholders become subject
increases. This results in a lower emphasis on total equity since a greater portion of it is taxed.
Harris et al. (2001) also use this methodology to demonstrate that investors value accumulated
retained earnings less per unit that contributed capital. Using firm-level data from the United
States, they show that the discount rate applied to dividends varies depending on the dividend tax
rate. They confirm these findings by looking at dividend taxes in five other countries.
However, Dhaliwal et al. (2003) and Hanlon et al. (2003) disagree with the methodology
and interpretation of the results in both Harris and Kemsley (1999) and Harris et al. (2001).
Dhaliwal et al. (2003) demonstrate that when looking at long-term stock returns, the conclusions
of Harris and Kemsley (1999) are not supported. Hanlon et al. (2003) question the validity of
incorporating the ratio of retained earnings to contributed capital into the Ohlson model (1995)
and conclude that, given its significance, this ratio must be a proxy for a correlated omitted
variable.
Fama and French (1997) also look for evidence in support of the tax capitalization view
using asset pricing models. If the tax capitalization hypothesis is true, they expect a negative
relationship between corporate value and dividend payments. When a corporation pays dividends,
the payout should no longer be included in the firm’s future value; thus, the stock price should
decline. Instead, they find a positive relationship between firm value and dividends and a negative
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relationship between leverage and value. They conclude that dividends and debt convey
information to the market about profitability that is not captured elsewhere.
This potential for dividend signaling and the restriction of manager discretion is
incorporated into the third view, the double taxation view (Poterba and Summers 1985, McClure
1977). Similar to dividend tax capitalization, this view contends that shareholder-level dividend
taxes are an additional tax on corporate profits. The primary difference between the two views is
the motivation behind paying dividends. The double taxation view holds that despite their tax
disadvantage, shareholders still reward corporations when they pay dividends by increasing the
corporate value (Poterba and Summers 1985, McClure 1977). The higher the dividend payout
ratio, the lower the weighted average tax rate of dividends and capital gains, and the lower the
shareholder’s required rate of return (Zodrow 1991, Poterba and Summers 1985). Thus, a
decrease in the taxation of dividends would lower the cost of capital, increasing investment and
the rate of return, which would result in a higher dividend payout ratio (Zodrow 1991, Poterba
and Summers 1985).
Using British data before and after changes in the way Great Britain taxes corporate
retained and distributed income, Poterba and Summers (1985) find that the double taxation view
is the closest match to their results and reject both the tax irrelevance and tax capitalization views.
Their results show that changes in dividend taxation significantly impact ex-dividend price
movements. Poterba and Summers (1985) also find that the announcement of a reduced dividend
tax rate is positively related to dividend yield. They conclude that dividend taxes reduce corporate
investment and distort capital allocations.
McKenzie and Thompson (1995) perform an event study investigating the impact an
increase in Canadian dividend tax had on stock prices. They compare only companies offering
both higher-yield preferred and lower-yield common shares. They find that the decrease in the
price of higher-yield preferred shares was significantly greater than the decrease in the price of
lower-yield common shares. They conclude that this finding supports the double taxation and tax
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capitalization views but not the tax irrelevance view. McKenzie and Thompson (1997) perform a
literature review of the research on the three dividend policy theories and conclude that the
double taxation view has the most support. Similarly, Zodrow (1991) reviews empirical studies
testing the double taxation and the tax capitalization views and determines that the double
taxation view has the most support.
Ayers et al. (2002) use the Revenue Recognition Act of 1993’s increase in the highest
individual tax rate to investigate the relationship between dividend policy and stock prices. Since
at that time U.S. individuals paid taxes on dividends, the increase in the highest individual tax
rate increased the dividend tax rate for shareholders in the highest bracket. Using a five-day event
window, they find that corporations with high dividend yields experienced the largest drop in
price and that institutional ownership mitigates this negative relationship. While both the tax
capitalization and double taxation views predict a decrease in stock prices following this type of
change, the tax capitalization view does not hold that the magnitude of the decrease will vary
according to the shareholder clientele. Thus Ayers et al. (2002) conclude that the existence of the
mitigating factor, institutional ownership, demonstrates the importance of corporate dividend
policy and supports the double taxation view over the tax capitalization view. Dhaliwal et al.
(2003) also use the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 to investigate the effects of the increase
in the highest individual tax bracket on stock prices. They document a positive relationship
between dividend yield and long-term stock returns which is mitigated by institutional ownership
which supports the traditional double taxation view.
As this section demonstrates, prior research examines the three corporate dividend policy
views in a variety of settings. While evidence supporting each view over the others exists,
evidence refuting each view or its assumptions also exists. The literature has not reached a
consensus as to the correct view.
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Shareholder-Level Dividend Taxes

A change in shareholder-level dividend tax creates the setting for this paper’s study.
During this study, both New Zealand and Australia begin taxing corporate profits only once
through dividend imputation credits. Though countries can implement such credits in a variety of
ways, the net effect of a dividend imputation credit is to reduce the double taxation of dividends
by reducing the tax shareholders pay on dividend income they receive. Some dividend imputation
credits permit shareholders to exclude dividends from gross income. Others require shareholders
to include dividends in gross income but offer credits to offset the tax liability attributable to all
or a portion of the dividend income.
Both the tax capitalization and the double taxation views contend that shareholder-level
dividend taxes are an additional tax on corporate profits. The difference between the two theories
is the motivation for paying dividends. The tax capitalization view implies that dividend policy is
irrelevant to price in the sense that what is not paid in dividends will be capitalized into price. The
traditional double taxation view suggests that dividend policy is extremely relevant to price since
the market rewards corporations for paying dividends (Ayers et al. 2002).
The results of the studies supporting the traditional double taxation view predict that a
reduction in the taxation of dividends will result in a lower cost of capital, an increase in current
capital investment spending, and an increase in the dividend payout ratio (McKenzie and
Thompson 1995, Poterba and Summers 1985, McClure 1977). As demonstrated in Poterba and
Summers (1985), the increase in the optimal dividend payout ratio stems from the fact that the
corporation’s cost of equity decreases since, after a dividend tax decrease, it does not pay as much
for shareholders to receive the same after-tax dividend. The firm’s marginal cost of paying
dividends and receiving the benefit of an increase in firm value is less, increasing the optimal
dividend payout ratio, which reduces the discount rate applied to future cash flows in determining
the firm’s value.

26

R&D Corporate-Level Taxes

This paper investigates a shareholder-level dividend tax change in countries with two
different R&D tax treatments. Here I explain R&D investment incentives. I then review the prior
R&D investment literature, demonstrating that the success of R&D investment incentives is still
debated in the literature.
Since firms often deduct R&D in the year incurred, R&D investment is tax favored in
comparison to capital investment. Additional R&D tax incentives come in a multitude of guises.
Tax regimes can offer R&D tax credits based on flat rates (Canada), R&D tax credits based on
incremental rates above a base (France, Japan, Spain, and the United States), or superdeductibility (more than 100 percent) of R&D expenses (Austria and Australia). Researchers still
debate the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives in increasing R&D investment and the
organizational factors influencing this investment (Hoskisson and Johnson 1992, Goel 1990, Hill
and Snell 1989, Bradley et al. 1984, Link and Long 1981).
Billings and Fried (1999) synthesize the R&D investment literature and test the influence
of the U.S. tax regime and four organizational factors’ influence on R&D investment. They find
that eligibility for the R&D incentive, the capital intensity, and the debt-to-equity ratio
significantly impact the amounts U.S. firms invest in R&D.18 Using time-series data, Brown
(1985) finds evidence that the U.S. R&D tax incentive included in the Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981 had a positive incentive effect. Berger (1993) expands Brown’s analysis by
separating firms in a position to take advantage of the R&D tax incentive from those not in such a
position (based on their tax liability for the current and previous three years and the difference
between their qualified R&D expenditures and base R&D levels). He also incorporates non-tax
factors into his model. His results show that the U.S. R&D tax incentive of 1981 increased R&D
investment for firms in a tax position to use the tax credit.

18

They do not find that unrelated diversification, defined as activity in industries outside of a company’s
primary industry, significantly impacts R&D investment.
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Several studies using U.S. data find results indicating an R&D tax incentive is not as
influential as Brown (1985) and Berger (1993) indicate (Billings and McGill 1992, Mansfield
1986, Eisner and Sullivan 1984). Using firm-level data, Eisner and Sullivan (1984) find that the
firm-specific, moving average base R&D incentive, introduced by the United States’ Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 has limited ability to stimulate research activity. Summarily,
Mansfield (1986) uses survey data and finds that this U.S. R&D tax incentive increased R&D
activity less than two percent annually, about one-third of the revenue the government lost as a
result of the credit. Billings and McGill (1992) find that, prior to the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990, which changed the R&D tax incentive from a moving-average
formula to a fixed-base percentage formula, the average rate of credit was 2.5 percent. After
1990, it was 1.9 percent.
Hall and Reenen (2000) survey the international literature on R&D tax incentive
effectiveness and conclude that the response in the United States to R&D tax incentives is greater
than the responses in Canada and France. Further, tax incentives do not have an effect on the
amount of R&D investment. In their survey of the literature, Hall and Reenen reference a 1993
study by the Australian Bureau of Industry Economics as “one of the most comprehensive and
carefully done of these [international] studies” (466). The Australian Bureau of Industry
Economics’ study combines Australian survey and econometric data surrounding the
implementation of super-deductibility, a 150 percent R&D tax deduction. The survey data
indicates that for 23 percent of the respondents, super-deductibility was critical in at least one
R&D project in the last three years, proceeding. Further, super-deductibility critically influenced
10 percent of R&D expenditures and was significant in continuing, widening, or improving
around 50 percent of the R&D projects. The Australian Bureau of Industry Economics’ study also
compares the R&D growth rates, controlling for firms’ abilities to use the tax deduction, and it
finds a benefit-cost elasticity of between 0.6 and 1.0, similar to that of the United States. Looking
at Canada, Mansfield and Switzer (1985) do not find support for an increase in R&D spending
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after the implementation of an R&D tax incentive. As the above studies show, the literature has
not reached consensus concerning the ability of R&D incentives to influence R&D investment.
Relationship Among Dividends, R&D Investment, and Tax Incentives

This section focuses on the relationship between dividend payment and R&D investment
when the tax incentives for each differ. Thomas et al. (2003) suggest that the reason for the mixed
results concerning the influence of R&D incentives on R&D investment is due to the different
ways countries tax dividends. They suggest that dividends and corporate investments compete for
limited funds; thus, a negative relationship between dividends and R&D investment exists.
Similarly, Smith (1995) suggests that, after implementing Australia’s dividend imputation credit,
investors preferred companies paying higher cash dividends instead of those investing in R&D.
Contrary to Smith (1995), Black et al. (2000) find that the dividend payout ratios in
Australia did not increase or decrease as a result of the dividend imputation credit. They run an
OLS regression examining the relationship between R&D investment and dividend payout ratios
before and after Australia implemented its dividend imputation credit.19 While they do not find a
significant relationship between R&D investment and dividend payout ratios before or after
dividend imputation, they do find a significant negative relationship between R&D investment
and the existence of dividend imputation. Black et al. (2000, 56) conclude “it appears that
dividend imputation stimulated capital investment in property, plant, and equipment at the
expense of research and development. A plausible explanation is that the more generous tax
benefits of R&D, generated in the form of immediate expensing, lost some of their value under
dividend imputation.”
Thomas et al. (2003) investigate three different tax regimes: one provides incentives for
paying dividends but not investing in R&D, one provides incentives for paying dividends and
investing in R&D, and one providing incentives for investing in R&D but not paying dividends.
Contrary to Black et al. (2000), they find evidence that the inverse relationship between R&D
19

Black et al. (2000) define dividend payout ratio as cash dividends divided by net earnings.
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expense and total dividends paid becomes stronger when the tax regime provides both an R&D
tax incentive and a dividend imputation credit as opposed to providing a credit for just one of
them. However, in this same analysis, they do not find the positive relationship between R&D
investment and R&D tax incentives which is central to the theory that the negative relationship
between dividend payment and R&D investment becomes stronger when incentives for both
exist.
Thomas et al. (2003) use a dummy variable to classify each country’s tax regime. Thus,
four of the six countries used in the study were coded “1” to indicate that their tax regime offered
an incentive for R&D investment. Such coding assumes that the R&D tax incentives in all four
countries do not differ. However, when Billings et al. (1994) examine the R&D investment in
four different countries, they find that the rate of tax credit differs in each country. Further, they
find that a significant positive relationship between R&D investment and the rate of tax credit on
total R&D expenditures exists.
Thomas et al.’s data also do not allow them to control for which firms within a tax regime
can use the R&D tax incentive. Berger (1993) demonstrates the importance of incorporating a
firm’s ability to use an R&D tax incentive. He shows that, once this is considered, the U.S. R&D
tax incentive of 1981, which prior research declared unsuccessful as an incentive, did increase
R&D investment for firms in a position to use it.
In summary two papers examine the relationship between dividends, R&D investment,
and their respective taxes. One paper uses an OLS regression to investigate dividend tax changes
within two different countries and does not find a significant relationship between the ratio of
cash dividends to net earnings, R&D investment, and their respective taxes (Black et al. 2000).
The other paper, Thomas et al. (2003), performs a cross-country analysis using simultaneous
equations and finds a significantly stronger negative relationship between total dividends paid and
R&D investments when tax incentives for both exist. However, they do not find the theorized
positive significant relationship between R&D expense and the existence of an R&D tax
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incentive nor do they include countries with neither tax incentive in their comparison. Using
different tax settings and analyses these papers reach two different conclusions regarding the
relationship among dividends, R&D investment and their respective taxes.
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Chapter IV
Theoretical Development

As shown in Partington’s (1985) funds flow identity, managers can only allocate
resources that are actually available for allocation. The sources of these resources, external
financing and earnings this period are allocated to the uses of these resources, this period’s
dividends and investments.

Dt + ∆It = ∆Ct + Yt

(7)

where
Dt = Dividends in period t;
∆It = Net change in investment in period t;
∆Ct = Net change in external financing in period t; and
Yt = Earnings in period t.
Uses of resources appear on the left-hand side of equation (7).20 They are expressed as
current period dividends and net change in investments.21 These uses of resources equal the
available resources, which are comprised of net change in external financing (∆Ct) and earnings
(Yt). As is typical with theoretical models, several assumptions are necessary for this identity to
hold. First, the firm must operate on a cash-only basis such that all earnings and new external
capital are readily available for dividends or investments. Second, the firm must pay dividends or
invest all of its earnings and new external capital each period. The first assumption that the firm
operates on a cash-only basis can be removed by replacing external financing (∆Ct) and earnings
(Yt) with net cash flows into the firm.

Dt + It = FCFBDt + ICFBNIt + OCFBRDt

(8)

where
20

Though share repurchases are a potential use of firm funds, they are not included in this discussion
because (1) New Zealand did not permit share repurchases during the time period used in this study and (2)
Australia permitted regulated repurchases only during the last three years of this study.
21
The term “net change in investments” incorporates the difference in all firm investments made during the
current period.
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It = New investments made in period t
FCFBRDt = Cash flow in period t from financing activities before dividends;
ICFBRDt = Cash flow in period t from investing activities before new investments; and
OCFBRDt = Cash flow in period t from operating activities before R&D expenses.
Net change in investment (∆It ) becomes new investments (It) because any cash received this
period for an investment previously held will appear in cash flow from investing activities before
new investments (ICFBNIt). If the firm then acquires another asset with this cash, the new asset
will appear in new investments (It).22 The equation still assumes that the firm chooses to pay
dividends or increase investment with all of the cash that it has available.
R&D Investment Incentives

As evidenced in Thomas et al. (2003), tax regimes can provide varying incentives for
R&D investment, investment in other assets, and dividend payments to shareholders. In a tax
regime providing no incentive to pay dividends but an additional incentive for R&D investment,
allocating limited resources to continued funding of old R&D projects or funding new R&D
projects lowers taxes the corporations pay and, thus, increases the net cash flow from operations.
Separating R&D investment from all other new investments and incorporating the tax savings
from R&D investment results in the following:

Dt + Ot + Rt = FCFBDt + ICFBNIt + OCFBRDt + δRt

(9)

where
Ot = All new investments other than R&D;
Rt = R&D investment; and
δ = rate of R&D investment tax incentive.

22

For example, a firm sells a building for $25,000 cash and then uses $20,000 of it to purchase equipment.
The $25,000 cash will appear on the right-hand side of the equation in cash flow from investing activities
before new investments (ICFBRDt) and the $20,000 will appear on the left-hand side of the equation in
new investments (It). The $5,000 difference will also appear on the left-hand side in the form of a different
new investment or dividends.
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R&D investment now costs less than other investments or dividend payments. Assuming funds
are fixed, firms have an increased incentive to invest more heavily in R&D. Depending on the
extent to which firms choose to use the tax incentive by investing in R&D, either investment in
other assets or dividend payments may decrease.
Dividend Tax Incentives

In a tax regime providing no incentive for R&D investment but granting an incentive for
dividend payments and assuming the double taxation view, allocating funds to paying dividends
reduces the cost of capital which results in dividends becoming more attractive than other
investments, including R&D. This alters equation (9) as follows:

Dt + Ot + Rt = FCFBDt + λDt + ICFBNIt + OCFBRDt

(10)

where λ represents the reduced cost of equity capital resulting from a dividend imputation credit.
When a country previously not offering R&D investment or dividend payment incentives
implements dividend imputation credits, corporations paying dividends should realize a decrease
in their cost of equity capital because a dividend imputation credit reduces or eliminates the
double taxation of dividends (Dhaliwal et al. 2003). By providing shareholders a tax credit for
dividends received or omitting dividends from shareholders’ net incomes, shareholders no longer
pay tax on the dividends. Corporations operating under these tax regimes actually have to pay less
in dividends for shareholders to receive the same after-tax returns; this reduces the corporation’s
cost of equity capital (Dhaliwal et al. 2003). Further, an imputation credit provides incentives for
corporations to switch from debt to equity financing, which also lowers their average cost of
capital and could increase corporations’ investment in equipment and structures (Black et al.
2000, Schulman et al. 1996, Auerbach and Hassett 1991, Cummins and Hassett 1992).
R&D Investment and Dividend Tax Incentives

What happens when the tax regime implements both incentives to pay dividends and to
invest in R&D? Mathematically, the inverse relationship between R&D investment and dividend
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payment will increase in firms paying dividends. As evidenced by combining equations (9) and
(10), this should help equate R&D investment and dividend payments since both increase the
firm’s available cash flow.

Dt + Ot + Rt = FCFBDt + λDt + ICFBNIt + OCFBRDt + δRt

(11)

Firms paying dividends now have an incentive to invest in R&D (δRt) and pay dividends (λDt).
Dividend-paying firms will have more difficulty allocating funds to R&D investments, dividend
payments, or other investments than if only one tax incentive existed. Every dollar they contribute
to paying dividends will increase their savings from the reduced cost of capital (λDt); however,
every dollar they use to pay dividends will reduce the funds available for R&D investment and
thus the R&D investment tax savings (δRt). Therefore, tax regimes offering both tax incentives
for R&D investment and dividend payments should exhibit the greatest inverse ratio between
R&D investments and dividend payouts. While the increase in the inverse ratio could result from
simply holding R&D investment constant and placing the savings from the lower cost of capital
into dividend payments, it could also result from decreasing R&D investment to further increase
dividend payment.
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Chapter V
Hypothesis Development

In July of 1985, Australia implemented an R&D investment tax incentive in the form of
super-deductibility. Super-deductibility permitted companies to deduct 150 percent of their R&D
expenses. While New Zealand did not offer an explicit tax R&D incentive, R&D expenses were
100 percent deductible.23 Before the respective 1987 and 1988 tax changes, neither Australia nor
New Zealand offered dividend imputation credits. Theoretically, I expect to find a negative
relationship between dividend payment and R&D expense regardless of tax incentives or
dividend tax views.24
When a corporation invests in R&D, it will have fewer funds available for capital
investments or dividend payments. Thomas et al. (2003) find a negative relationship between
R&D investment and dividend payment when looking at the United Kingdom, Canada, France,
Germany, Japan and the United States. When looking at New Zealand and Australia, Black et al.
(2000), do not find a significant relationship between R&D investment and dividend payment in
either country. Given the mixed results, I investigate the relationship between R&D investment
and dividend payment and between R&D investment and capital expenditures. The signs of these
relationships, themselves, are not crucial to my study. I am interested in what happens to the
relationships as the tax regimes change. Therefore, I need to know what the relationships look
like in the countries prior to the tax regime changes. To test these relationships, I define two tax
regimes. As Table 2 shows, Tax Regime I provides incentives for neither R&D investment nor
dividend payments (corresponding to Australia prior to July 1985 and New Zealand prior to

23

I use the same classification approach as Thomas et al. (2003) and do not classify countries with only a
100 percent R&D deduction as ones offering incentives for investment in R&D.
24
My first two hypotheses focus on relationships among R&D investment, dividends, and MTRs at a point
in time and, thus, are not indicative of a particular dividend policy view.
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1988) and Tax Regime II provides only R&D investment incentives (corresponding to Australia
from July 1985 to June 1987).25 The first hypothesis is:26
H1a: A negative relationship between a firm’s R&D investment and capital investment
will exist in both Tax Regimes I and II.
H1b: A negative relationship between a firm’s R&D investment and dividend payment
will exist in both Tax Regimes I and II.
The monetary benefit an R&D tax incentive provides is not the same for all firms within a
country (Billings and Fried 1999, Billings et al. 1994, Berger 1993, Brown 1985). The marginal
rate of credit and the average rate of credit typically measure the benefit an R&D incentive
provides corporations (Eisner and Sullivan 1984, Altshuler 1989, Billings et al. 1994). The
average rate of credit measures the tax credit received on total R&D expenditures while the
marginal rate of credit indicates the tax credit a corporation will receive from investing an
additional dollar in R&D (Billings et al. 1994). Since the R&D tax incentives in Australia and
New Zealand are both in the form of deductions, a firm’s MTR indicates the tax benefits it will
receive from an additional dollar of R&D investment. Firms with higher MTRs should invest
more in R&D since they receive more benefit from R&D expenses than firms with lower MTRs.
Thus, prior to each of the tax changes in Australia (July 1985 and July 1987) and the tax change
in New Zealand (April 1988), firms positioned to benefit from the R&D deduction should have
invested more heavily in R&D.
H2: A positive relationship between a firm’s R&D expense and MTR will exist in both
Tax Regimes I and II.

25

Due to the implementation of dividend imputation in July of 1987, Australia was a country offering only
an R&D investment tax incentive for only two years. However, as cited on page 489 of Australia’s Industry
Commission 1995 Research and Development Report, “The largest year-on-year increases in BERD
[Business Enterprise R&D] during the complete decade occurred in 1985-86 and 1986-87.” This is despite
a 15 percent per year rate of increase in BERD from 1981-82 to 1984-85.
26
All hypotheses appear in alternative form.
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Effect of R&D Investment Incentives in the Absence of Dividend Imputation

In July of 1985, the R&D tax deduction for R&D investment in Australia increased from
100 percent to 150 percent.27 This allowed Australian companies to receive more tax benefit from
R&D investment. As equation (11) shows, when a tax regime moves from offering neither an
R&D investment tax incentive nor dividend imputation (defined as Tax Regime I) to offering an
R&D investment tax incentive (defined as Tax Regime II), the relationship between R&D
investment and dividend payment changes. At this point in time, firms began receiving additional
savings from investing in R&D as compared with paying dividends. Therefore, when Australia
implemented its R&D investment tax incentive in 1985, the relationship between R&D
investment and dividend payment should have become weaker (less negative).
H3: When a country moves from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime II, there will be a weaker
relationship between R&D investment and dividend payment.
Effect of Dividend Imputation in the Absence of Explicit R&D Incentives

As stated above, when a country offers tax incentives for only R&D investment (equation
(9)) or only dividend payment (equation (10)), the inverse relationship between the two should
not be as strong as when the tax regime does not offer a tax incentive for either of them (equation
(8)). However, the dividend policy views vary in their predictions of the effects of a dividend
imputation credit. As summarized in Table 3, Panel A, the tax irrelevance view predicts that
dividend imputation credits will not change the dividend payment or the relationship between
R&D investment and dividend payment. Similarly, the tax capitalization view states that any
change in the dividend payment is the result of a change in the firm’s corporate investment
opportunities; thus, a dividend imputation credit will not change the firm’s corporate investment
policy.
27

The implementation of super-deductibility, a 150 percent R&D deduction, alters the calculation of
corporate taxes. It does not offer a setting in which to analyze the dividend policy views since all three
views contend that a change in corporate taxes could alter corporate investments or dividend payments.
Hypotheses 4, 6, 7, and 9 use the dividend tax changes in 1987 and 1988 to investigate which dividend
policy view is most supportable.
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Only the double taxation view of dividend policy suggests that a change in the way
dividends are taxed will alter the dividend payment. According to this view, the market rewards
dividend-paying firms by increasing stock prices when firms pay dividends. A decrease in the
dividend tax decreases the amount of pre-tax dividend necessary for shareholders to receive the
same after-tax dividend. This reduction in the cost of equity capital reduces the firm’s cost of
receiving the market’s reward of an increased stock price. Thus, capital investment and the
dividend payout ratio will increase (Poterba and Summers 1985, 4). As mentioned earlier, prior
corporate dividend policy research does not address R&D investment alone. Instead it either
includes it as part of capital investment or excludes it completely. Thus, the double taxation view
of corporate dividend policy does not predict a direction for the change in R&D investment
(Table 3, Panel A). Following a decrease in dividend taxes, the increases in the capital investment
and dividend payment predicted by the double taxation view have to be funded by either the
decrease in the average cost of capital, newly raised capital or as suggested by Thomas et al.
(2003), a decrease in R&D investments. New Zealand’s 1988 tax change provides a setting in
which to explore these relationships and dividend views.
In 1988, New Zealand changed its tax regime from one offering tax incentives for neither
R&D investment nor dividend payment to one offering tax incentives for paying dividends.28
According to Thomas et al. (2003), after this change, New Zealand firms that typically paid
dividends should have now found paying dividends more attractive than investing in R&D. At
this time, New Zealand also decreased its highest corporate tax rate by 15 percentage points (from
48 to 33 percent). This reduced the tax benefit of the implicit incentive for R&D investment,
making the incentive for the payment of dividends even stronger. This does not alter the
predictions under the double taxation view. However, corporate tax rates affect the cost of capital
calculation under both the tax irrelevance and tax capitalization views of corporate dividend
28

New Zealand did continue to offer immediate deduction of 100 percent of the R&D expenses. To be
consistent with prior literature, the 100 percent deduction is not classified as an explicit incentive to invest
in R&D.

39

policy. Reducing the cost of capital results in an increase in capital investments according to both
of these views (McKenzie and Thompson 1997, Zodrow 1991, Poterba and Summers 1985,
Miller and Scholes 1978). Panels A and B of Table 3 summarize the effects these tax changes
should have on dividend-paying firms and their R&D investment, capital investment, and
dividend payment according to the three views of how dividend taxes affect corporate dividend
policies. Defining Tax Regime III as providing only a tax incentive for dividend payment (Table
2), the forth hypothesis is as follows:
H4a: When a country moves from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, dividend-paying
firms will alter their R&D investment.29
H4b: When a country moves from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, dividend-paying
firms will increase their capital investment.
H4c: When a country moves from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, dividend-paying
firms will increase their dividend payment.
As equation (10) demonstrates, the implementation of the dividend imputation credit
makes paying dividends more attractive than R&D investment or other assets. Firms will receive
more benefit from the decrease in the cost of capital as they pay more in dividends. The decision
to pay dividends should be easier than when neither a tax incentive for R&D investment or
dividend payment exists or when incentives for both exist (equation 11). Thus, the relationship
between R&D investment and dividend payment should become weaker (less negative).
H5a: When a country moves from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, there will be a
weaker relationship between R&D investment and dividend payment in dividendpaying firms.
Despite the reduction in the highest corporate tax rate, New Zealand dividend-paying
firms with higher MTRs should have found R&D investments an attractive option since they
29

When all of the corporate dividend policy views predict no change or do not provide a prediction, the
hypothesis is non-directional.
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could claim the 100 percent R&D deduction. Dividend-paying firms with lower MTRs were not
in as advantageous a position to use the R&D deduction. Thus, the weakening of the relationship
between R&D investing and paying dividends should be smaller for firms with higher MTRs than
firms with lower MTRs.
H5b: When a country moves from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, the weakening of
dividend-paying firms’ relationship between R&D expense and dividend payment
will be greater among those firms with lower MTRs.
The tax irrelevance and tax capitalization views suggest that the implementation of a
dividend imputation credit will not affect the dividend payment in firms not typically paying
dividends (Table 4, Panel A). According to the tax irrelevance view, shareholder-level taxes do
not affect dividend payments; thus, any change in dividend taxation is irrelevant. The tax
capitalization view holds that implementing a dividend tax change will not change the dividend
payment (Poterba and Summers 1985). While both views contend that it should not alter dividend
payments, decreasing the highest corporate tax rate reduces the cost of capital, increasing capital
investment (Table 4, Panel B).
While the double taxation view holds that dividend taxes affect dividend policy,
shareholders of non-dividend-paying firms do not expect to receive dividends. Since these firms
have not been paying dividends, they will not experience tax savings from lower equity costs
(Table 4, Panel A). However, decreasing corporate tax rates also reduces the cost of capital under
the double taxation view and increases capital investments (Table 4, Panel B).
H6a: When a country moves from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, non-dividend-paying
firms will alter R&D investment.
H6b: When a country moves from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, non-dividend-paying
firms will increase capital investment.
H6c: When a country moves from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, non-dividend-paying
firms will not alter dividend payment.
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Effect of Dividend Imputation in the Presence of Explicit R&D Incentives

Australia’s 1987 tax change also provides a setting in which to test the relationships
among the uses of firm resources and the views of what affects corporate dividend policy. In July
of 1987, Australia altered its tax regime from one offering tax incentives only for R&D
investment (defined as Tax Regime II) to one offering tax incentives both for R&D investment
and dividend payments (defined as Tax Regime IV). According to the double taxation view, the
implementation of a dividend imputation credit will directly impact the payment of dividends in
dividend-paying firms (Table 3, Panel C). The dividend imputation credit allows firms to pay less
in dividends while shareholders receive the same after-tax dividend payment. The reduced equity
costs make paying dividends and capital investments attractive uses of firm resources (Poterba
and Summers 1985, 4).
At this time, Australia also implemented a capital gains tax. A capital gains tax would not
cause a change in the dividend payment or investment policy under the tax irrelevance view. The
tax capitalization view contends that implementing a capital gains tax will decrease the after-tax
appreciation shareholders receive when they sell their stock (Table 3, Panel D). In turn, this will
increase the cost of capital and discourage capital investment (McKenzie and Thompson 1997, 9).
Under the double taxation view, the cost of capital depends on a weighted average of shareholderlevel dividend taxes and capital gains taxes. An increase in capital gains taxes alone would
increase a firm’s cost of capital. This increase in the cost of capital would decrease investments
and dividend payout ratios. However, when coupled with dividend imputation which as discussed
above, has the opposite effect on the cost of capital, it is not possible to predict the movement in
R&D investment, capital investment, or dividend payment.
H7a: When a country moves from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, dividend-paying
firms will alter R&D investment.
H7b: When a country moves from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, dividend-paying
firms will increase capital investment.
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H7c: When a country moves from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, dividend-paying
firms will increase dividend payment.
As equation (11) demonstrates, when a country offers tax incentives for both R&D
investment and dividend payment, the savings a firm receives from the R&D tax incentive
depends on the amount invested in R&D, and the savings a firm receives from the decrease in the
cost of capital depends on the amount of dividends they pay. After 1987, Australia’s tax regime
offered tax incentives for both R&D investment and dividend payment. Since both R&D
investment and dividend payments pose tax advantages, the decision to participate in one over the
other became more difficult than when a tax credit for only one of them existed. This should
strengthen the relationship between these two uses of firm funds.
H8a: When a country moves from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, there will be a
stronger relationship between R&D investment and dividend payment in
dividend-paying firms.
Adding a dividend tax credit to a tax regime offering an R&D tax incentive reduces the
difference in the tax benefit provided by R&D investment and dividend payment (equation (11)).
Further, firms with lower MTRs versus firms with higher MTRs will not find it as difficult to
increase dividend payment since the R&D tax incentive was not extremely beneficial to them. On
the other hand, firms with higher MTRs will find it harder to switch from investing in R&D to
paying dividends since R&D investment results in a high (150 percent) tax deduction.
H8b: When a country moves from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, the increase in
strength of dividend-paying firms’ relationships between R&D expense and
dividend payment will be greater among those firms with higher MTRs.
All three views of corporate dividend policy contend that non-dividend-paying firms
would not be affected by the implementation of dividend imputation (Table 4, Panel C).
However, a capital gains tax causes shareholders to pay a tax on any profit they received when
selling their shares. According to the tax capitalization view, any change in dividend payment
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which occurs after a dividend imputation credit is merely the result of a change in the firm’s
investment decision, unless coupled with a capital gains tax (Zodrow 1991, Poterba and Summers
1985). Since capital gains taxes hinder corporate investments, it is plausible that under the tax
capitalization view, firms would begin paying dividends (Table 4, Panel D).
The double taxation view also contends that non-dividend-paying firms may begin
paying dividends because: (1) with the implementation of the capital gains tax, shareholders will
have to pay tax on the profit they receive when they sell their stock, and (2) coupled with the
capital gains tax and dividend imputation credit, shareholders will prefer that these firms begin
paying dividends (Poterba and Summers 1985). This assumes of course that the reduction in
dividend tax has a greater impact on the cost of capital calculation than the implementation of a
capital gains tax.
H9a: When a country moves from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, non-dividendpaying firms will alter R&D investment.
H9b: When a country moves from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, non-dividendpaying firms will increase capital investment.
H9c: When a country moves from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, non-dividendpaying firms will increase dividend payment.
Further, the double taxation view contends that firms with lower MTRs receive less tax
benefit from R&D investment. These firms will find it more tax efficient, vis-à-vis higher MTR
firms, to pay dividends instead of subjecting shareholders to greater capital gains taxes by
investing the funds in retained earnings, R&D, or other assets.
H10a: When a country moves from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, the change in nondividend-paying firms’ R&D investment will be greater among those firms with
lower MTRs.
H10b: When a country moves from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, the change in nondividend-paying firms’ capital investment will be greater among those firms with
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lower MTRs.
H10c: When a country moves from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, the increase in
non-dividend-paying firms’ dividend payment will be greater among those firms
with lower MTRs.
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Chapter VI
Research Design

As previously discussed, this paper assumes that the decisions of R&D investment and
dividend payment occur simultaneously. The theory supports a relationship between these two
uses of funds. This paper tests and builds on the only paper explicitly investigating the
relationship between R&D investment and dividend payments, Thomas et al. (2003) which
assumes that the decision to invest in R&D is not totally independent of the dividend payment
decision or other capital expenditures.30 For comparability, this study uses a similar set of
simultaneous equations, which consists of a model for R&D investment and a model for dividend
payment. Also this section introduces three new variables to the set of simultaneous equations
used to test the hypotheses—the corporate before-R&D MTR, the individual tax rate, and the
statutory tax rate for corporations.
R&D Investment Model

In the first of the simultaneous equations models, the R&D investment model, the
dependent variable is the R&D expense the firm reported in the current year. It is not deflated by
sales; instead, the natural log of total sales is included as a control variable (Thomas et al. 2003,
Barth and Kallapur 1996). The independent variables are the before-R&D MTR and the dividend
payment. Since R&D is tax deductible, a firm lowers its MTR when it invests in R&D. Similar to
the before-financing MTR variable in Graham et al. (1998), the before-R&D MTR (BRDMTR)
variable measures the MTR prior to the firm investing in R&D. After adding the R&D expense to
the taxable income, I derive Shelvin’s (1990) trichotomous variable. The trichotomous variable
equals the top statutory rate if the corporation has positive taxable income but not a net operating

30

Several papers investigate the relationship between financing, investing, and paying dividends. Smirlock
and Marshall (1983) use Granger causality to see if dividend decisions influence investment decisions.
They conclude that dividends are not causal related to investments. Mougoue and Mukherjee (1994)
incorporate financing decisions into this methodology and determine that the three activities are
independent. However, investment consisted of plant, property, and equipment in both studies, so they did
not consider R&D investment.
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loss (NOL) carryforward from prior years, one-half of the statutory rate if the corporation has
negative taxable income (i.e., a current year NOL) or an NOL carryforward but not both, and zero
if the firm has negative taxable income and an NOL carryforward. The second dependent
variable, the dividend payout (DIVPAY) is the total amount paid in dividends for the current
year. It is the product of the dividend payment per share and the number of shares outstanding.
As in Thomas et al. (2003), the model includes controls for the funds available, the firm’s
financial position, and external influences. Research has shown that the ability to invest in R&D
depends on available funds. The two-year average of cash from operations (AVGOPCF) and cash
from financing (AVGFCF) proxy for these funds. Also included is the amount of capital
investment (CAPEX); funds invested in capital are not available for R&D investment.
Firms under financial distress are less likely to invest in R&D because firm-specific
assets created through R&D cannot easily be used to pay down debt (Bhagat and Welch 1995).
The firm’s beginning-of-the-year debt-to-assets ratio (DEBT) measures the firm’s financial
distress. Research shows that managers incorporate the effect R&D investment will have on
current-period earnings when determining the R&D outlay (Baber et al. 1991, Elliot et al. 1984).
Thus, the current level of earnings before taxes and research (EBTR) is included as a control
variable. The model includes controls for the firm’s size (SIZE) and last year’s R&D expense
(LRDX) since they have both been shown to influence the current year’s R&D investment
(Berger 1993, Tillinger 1991).
The model controls for external influences through the inclusion of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) and the firm’s book-value-to-market-value ratio (B/M). The Gross Domestic
Product captures the economic variations and serves as a control variable for time since the data
is annual. As in Thomas et al. (2003), the book-value-to-market-value ratio proxies for Tobin’s q,
a measurement of the marginal benefit to the marginal cost of an additional unit of investment
(Tillinger 1991). This variable captures the marginal benefit in terms of the value the market
places on the investment. It does not capture the benefit through the tax savings the before-R&D
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MTR variable captures. This variable also speaks to the line of research indicating that the market
capitalizes R&D and that market value is a determinant of R&D spending (Green et al. 1996, Lev
and Sougiannis 1996).
I include two additional control variables that Thomas et al. (2003) did not, the maximum
individual tax rate (IRATE) and the maximum statutory corporate tax rate (CRATE). The tax
reforms investigated in this study include significant reductions in both the corporate and
individual income tax rates. Since both of these rates affect corporate investment, I include them
as controls.31
Dividend Payment Model

The dividend payment model is similar to the R&D investment model. This equation
serves to complete the simultaneous system of equations. The dependent variable, dividend
payment (DIVPAY) is the same as that in the R&D investment model. The before-R&D MTR
(BRDMTR) is included to distinguish between firms that can and cannot benefit from R&D tax
incentives. Firms which cannot benefit from R&D tax incentives would be more likely to pay
dividends. The R&D spending (RDX) is included since it is a competing use of the funds. The
controls in this equation are similar to those in the R&D investment model. The proxies for funds
available are the two-year average of cash from operations (AVGOPCF) and cash from financing
(AVGFCF). The amount of capital investment (CAPEX) captures an alternative way of investing
the firm’s funds. The maximum individual tax rate (IRATE) and maximum corporate tax rate
(CRATE) are also included to control for the effect tax rates can have on corporate investment.
Partington (1989) finds the cost of financing also influences dividend payment. The
firm’s beginning-of-the-year debt-to-assets ratio (DEBT) proxies for this cost. Partington (1989)
finds that profitability is the most important determinant of dividend policy. Thus, the current
31

Again, share repurchases are not included because, at this time, they were not permitted in New Zealand,
and Australia did not permit them until 1991. From 1991 to 1995, Australian repurchases (buy-backs) were
highly regulated, and only 44 companies (less then four percent of the Australian Stock Exchange)
participated in them (Mitchell and Robinson 1996) compared to 50 percent of the companies in the New
York Stock Exchange from 1954 to 1963 (Guthart 1965).
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level of earnings before taxes and research expenditures (EBTR) is included as a control variable.
He also finds that managers consider the effects dividend policy can have on share price. The
market penalizes firms typically paying dividends when they omit dividend payments (Akhigbe
and Madura 1996). Thus, last year’s dividend payment (LDIVPAY) is included in the model.
Size is included as another proxy for one of Partington’s dividend determinants, the cost
of financing. Two additional control variables, the percent change in earnings growth (EGROW)
and the proportion of return received from capital gains (CAPRET) are also included in the
dividend model. The percent change in earnings (EGROW) captures company growth. Alli et al.
(1993) show that firms with high growth are less likely to pay dividends since the retained funds
can help finance future growth. Investors also can receive returns on investment through capital
gains. This is captured in the proportion of return received from capital gains (CAPRET),
measured as the annual return provided to investors through price appreciation.
The system of equations is as follows:
R&D Investment Model

(12)

RDX = α1 + β11BRDMTR + β21DIVPAY + β31AVGOPCF + β41AVGFCF + β51CAPEX
+ β61DEBT + β71EBTR + β81LRDX + β91SIZE + β101GDP + β111B/M + β121CRATE +
β131IRATE + β141IMPCRED + β151IMPCRED*BRDMTR + β161IMPCRED*CAPEX +
β171IMPCRED*DIVPAY + ε
Dividend Payment Model

(13)

DIVPAY = α2 + β12 BRDMTR + β22RDX + β32AVGOPCF + β42AVGFCF + β52CAPEX
+ β62DEBT + β72EBTR + β82LDIVPAY + β92SIZE + β102EGROW + β112CAPRET +
β122CRATE + β132IRATE + β142IMPCRED + ε
where
RDX = reported R&D expense (Worldscope Database item 0119)
BRDMTR = before-R&D marginal tax rate calculated by adding R&D expense
to the taxable income and then determining Shelvin’s (1990)
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trichotomous variable; Shelvin’s (1990) trichotomous variable
equals the top statutory rate if the corporation has before-R&D
taxable income and no NOL carryforward, one-half of this rate if
the corporation has negative before-R&D taxable income or an
NOL carryforward but not both, and zero if the firm has negative
before-R&D taxable income and an NOL carryforward;
DIVPAY = dividend payment or total cash dividends paid (4551);
AVGOPCF = average cash from operations for the current and prior years,
which is the sum of income before extraordinary items and
preferred dividends (1551), depreciation, depletion, and
amortization (1151) and R&D expense (1201);
AVGFCF = average cash from financing for the current and prior years, which
is the sum of change in long-term debt (3251) and change in
common equity (3501) minus the difference between net income
after preferred dividends (1706) and common dividends (5376);
CAPEX = capital expenditures (4601);
DEBT = beginning-of-the-year debt-to-assets ratio, which is the sum of
total assets (2999) less common equity (3501) and preferred stock
(3451) divided by total assets (2999);
EBTR = earnings before taxes and research spending, which is the sum of
pretax income (1401) and R&D expense (1201);
LRDX = R&D expense for the prior year;
SIZE = natural log of total sales (1001);
GDP = gross domestic product;
B/M = beginning-of-the-year book-to-market ratio, which is market
capitalization (8001) divided by common equity (3501);
EGROW = earnings growth, which is the percent change in pretax earnings
(1401) from the previous year to the current year;
CAPRET = capital return, which is the annual return to the shareholders
through price appreciation measured as market capitalization
(8001) divided by common equity (3501);
CRATE = statutory corporate tax rate;
IRATE = statutory individual tax rate; and
IMPCRED = a dummy variable equaling one when a dividend imputation credit
is available.
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Since R&D spending and dividend payment are determined in conjunction with one
another and the variables in the two equations are related, I use three stage least squares (3SLS) to
run the system of equations.32 This method allows for the possibility of contemporaneous
correlation between the disturbances in the two structural equations (Johnston and DiNardo 1997,
317). The first two stages of 3SLS are similar to two stage least squares (2SLS). The first stage
obtains the predicted values for the endogenous regressors. The second stage uses the predicted
values from stage one to estimate the equations’ errors and then uses these to estimate the
contemporaneous variance-covariance matrix of the structural equations’ errors. Finally the third
stage obtains the estimates by applying generalized least squares to the large equation, which
consists of the system of equations (Mukherjee et al. 1998, 450).
Data Selection

To test the hypotheses, I examine pooled cross-section firm-year Australian and New
Zealand data from the fiscal year ending 1982 to the fiscal year ending 1993. Where available, the
data comes from the Worldscope Global Researcher Database via Thompson Financial and
Datastream Advance 4.0. The remainder of the data is hand-collected from the Australian
Graduate School of Management Annual Report File and the Australian Stock Exchange annual
reports housed in Perth, Western Australia. I delete firm-years where the data needed to calculate
the regressions are unavailable.33 Further, only domestic firms are kept in the sample since these
are the firms which will be most affected by a tax change in their country. Consistent with
Thomas et al. (2003), this paper defines domestic firms as those with (1) less than 50 percent of
their total sales due to foreign sales, (2) less than 50 percent of their total assets located abroad,

32

3SLS differs from 2SLS in that it estimates all of the parameters of the model jointly while 2SLS
estimates only the identified structural equation of interest. The 3SLS estimator is consistent and
asymptotically more efficient than the 2SLS estimator.
33
One of the proxies for funds available, average financing cash flows, requires the availability of firm data
for at least two years prior to being included in the sample. Thus three years of consecutive data must be
available for the firm to be included in the sample.
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and (3) less than 50 percent of their total income due to foreign income. The complete sample
contains 695 firm-year observations.
Descriptive Statistics

Table 5 displays the means and medians of the variables for each country. Similar to
Black et al.’s (2000) paper investigating tax changes in New Zealand and Australia, New Zealand
firms compose approximately 10 percent of the sample.34 The means of the dependent variable of
interest, R&D expense (RDX) are not statistically different in the two countries. The mean for the
before-R&D MTR (BTRMTR) is 25 percent in New Zealand which is lower than the highest
corporate statutory rate in New Zealand, indicating the presence of an NOL or negative taxable
income. The average prior year’s R&D expense (LRDX) is less than the current year’s average in
both countries. The means of dividend payment (DIVPAY), average operating cash flow
(AGVOPCF), gross domestic product (GDP), prior year dividend payment (LDIVPAY), and
growth in earnings (EGROW) are much higher in Australia than in New Zealand. Except for the
gross domestic product, the medians of these variables are similar, indicating skewness in the
average calculations.
Tables 6 through 8 contain the Pearson correlation matrices for the combined sample,
New Zealand sample, and Australian sample, respectively. As in Black et al. (2000), the measures
for dividend imputation, corporate tax rate, and individual tax rates are highly correlated. The
corporate and individual tax rates are included to control for changes in these statutory rates. The
dividend imputation dummy variable is included to determine changes related to dividend
imputation.

34

In Black et al.’s (2000) paper, New Zealand firms compose 13.5 percent of the sample.
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Chapter VII
Results

Running the set of simultaneous equations shown in equations (12) and (13) on the New
Zealand and Australian samples of firm-years separately, tests the first hypothesis. Table 9
contains the New Zealand results.35 The model includes a dummy variable indicating the
existence of dividend imputation (IMPCRED) and its interaction with dividend payment
(IMPCRED*DIVPAY) and capital expenditures (IMPCRED*CAPEX). Therefore the dividend
payment variable (DIVPAY) and capital expenditure variable (CAPEX) capture the period where
neither an R&D investment tax incentive nor dividend payment tax incentive exist, Tax Regime
I.36 In Tax Regime I, using New Zealand data, the relationships between R&D expenses and
capital expenditures (CAPEX) and between R&D expenses and dividend payment (DIVPAY) are
in the predicted direction but insignificant.37 This does not provide support for H1a nor H1b in
New Zealand’s Tax Regime I.
Table 10 contains the results of running the set of simultaneous equations on the
Australian sample of firm-years prior to dividend imputation (from July 1981 to June 1985). The
model includes a dummy variable indicating the existence of an R&D tax incentive
(R&DINCENT) and its interaction with dividend payment (R&DINCENT*DIVPAY) and capital
expenditures (R&DINCENT*CAPEX). Therefore the dividend payment variable (DIVPAY) and
capital expenditure variable (CAPEX) capture the period where neither an R&D investment tax
incentive nor dividend payment tax incentive exist, Tax Regime I. Due to the high correlation
between the individual tax rate (IRATE), corporate tax rate (CRATE), and the before-MTR

35

The dividend payment model controls for the interdependence in the system of equations. Thus,
throughout the paper, I use the results from the R&D model to answer my research questions.
36
Due to the multicollinearity between the individual tax rate (IRATE), the corporate tax rate (CRATE)
and the before-MTR variable (BRDMTR), I also run the system of simultaneous equations without the
corporate tax rate, without the individual tax rate, and without either tax rates. The results do not change.
37
Not finding a significant relationship between R&D investment and dividend payment in New Zealand is
consistent with Black et al.’s (2000) finding when running their OLS regression on New Zealand data using
R&D investment as the dependent variable.
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variable (BRDMTR), the system of simultaneous equations will not run on the Australian data
prior to dividend imputation.38 Since the individual tax rate is included in the model primarily
because of its influence on dividend payment following dividend imputation, and this sample
represents Australia prior to dividend imputation, I drop the individual tax rate variable (IRATE)
from the system of equations.39 In Tax Regime I, using Australian data, I find a significant
negative relationship between R&D expenses and capital expenditures (CAPEX); the relationship
between R&D expenses and dividend payment (DIVPAY) is in the predicted negative direction
but insignificant. Thus, the Australian Tax Regime I evidence supports H1a but not H1b.40
Australian firms operating after the implementation of R&D super-deductibility, but prior
to dividend imputation’s implementation, compose Tax Regime II. The results in Table 10 also
contain the relationships between R&D expenses and capital expenditures and between R&D
expenses and dividend payment during this period. To evaluate them, one must examine the
coefficients of the variables in Table 10 and their interactions with the dummy for the R&D tax
incentive of super-deductibility (R&DINCENT). Combining the coefficient of capital
expenditures (CAPEX = -.0104) with the coefficient for the interaction between the availability
of R&D super-deductibility and capital expenditures (R&DINCENT*CAPEX = .0103), results in
a negative coefficient (-.0001) for the relationship between R&D expense and capital
expenditures. This finding supports H1a in Tax Regime II. In this same setting, a negative,
significant relationship between R&D expense and dividend payment is not found and thus, H1b
is not supported.

38

When running a three stage least squares regression on simultaneous equations, Stata automatically drops
any variables causing multicollinearity issues.
39
The results of the system of simultaneous equations do not change when instead of dropping the
individual tax rate (IRATE) from the model, I drop the corporate tax rate (CRATE), nor when I drop both
the individual tax rate (IRATE) and corporate tax rate (CRATE).
40
Not finding a significant relationship between R&D investment and dividend payment in Australia is
consistent with Black et al.’s (2000) finding when running their OLS regression on Australia data using
R&D investment as the dependent variable.
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The second hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between R&D expense and the
before-R&D MTR in both Tax Regimes I and II. As Tables 9 and 10 show, this variable is only
significant in Tax Regime I for New Zealand firms. Here, firms with higher MTRs tend to invest
more heavily in R&D despite the absence of a tax incentive for R&D investment. This supports
H2 in Tax Regime I for New Zealand but not Tax Regime I or II for Australia.
In conclusion, when investigating the initial relationships between R&D investment and
dividend payment and between R&D investment and capital investment, the only significant
relationships are between R&D investment and capital investment in Australian Tax Regimes I
and II. Further they are negative, suggesting that as Australian firms invest less in capital as they
invest more in R&D. Again, not finding support for H1a, a negative relationship between R&D
investment and dividend payout does not threaten the validity of this study or its data. The
purpose of the first two hypotheses is simply to understand the setting prior to the tax regime
changes.
The third hypothesis investigates firms moving from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime II—
Australia before and after the R&D tax incentive. Here the prediction is a weaker or less negative
relationship between R&D investment and dividend payment after the R&D tax incentive’s
implementation. Before and after the implementation of super-deductibility, this relationship is
negative (Table 10). However, since it is insignificant in both cases, the results cannot support
H3.41 As shown in Table 13, the sample size of Australian firms in Tax Regimes I and II is 192.
The post-hoc observed power is 0.99, indicating that low power is likely not the reason for a lack
of significance.
The fourth and fifth hypotheses investigate actions of dividend-paying firms moving
from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III—New Zealand before and after dividend imputation.42 H4

41

The change from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime II involves a change in corporate taxes (via a 150 percent
R&D deduction), and thus, cannot be used to investigate the dividend policy views.
42
Hypotheses four and five correspond to hypotheses seven and eight which investigate dividend-paying
firms moving from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV (Australia from July 1988 to June 1993).
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compares the amounts of dividend payment, capital investment, and R&D investment in Tax
Regime II with Tax Regime IV, to determine the dominant dividend policy view. H5 investigates
the change in the relationship between R&D investment and dividend payment when moving
from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV. Using the nonparametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test to
investigate H4a shows that R&D expense deflated by size changed (decreased) significantly (z =
1.80, p = 0.0714) after dividend imputation.43,44 Running it on capital expenditures, deflated by
size and dividend payment, deflated by earnings tests H4b and H4c.45 The results do not show a
significant change in the median of capital expenditures so H4b is not supported. However, they
do indicate a marginally significant increase in dividend payment (z = -1.25, p = 0.10) after
dividend imputation, supporting H4c. When New Zealand moved from Tax Regime I to Tax
Regime III, it also lowered its corporate tax rate. As Table 4, Panel B shows, all of the corporate
dividend policy views predict that R&D investment could change and that capital expenditures
should increase after moving from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III. Further while the double
taxation view suggests that dividend payment should increase, the other two views also hold that
it may. Since capital investment did not increase, the results cannot support one corporate
dividend policy view over another.
Generating the system of simultaneous equations (12) and (13), using only dividendpaying, New Zealand firms, investigates the changes in the relationship between R&D investment
and dividend payment when moving between these two tax regimes.46 The relationship between
R&D expense and dividend payment in both tax regimes is insignificant. This insignificance does
not support Thomas et al.’s (2003) idea that dividend imputation increases dividend payment at
43

The R&D expense variable is not deflated when running the system of simultaneous equations since a
firm size variable is included in the equations as a control variable.
44
I run the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test because Bartlett’s test for equal variances rejects the null
hypothesis of equal variances in the deflated R&D expense variable, and thus the parametric t-test would
not be appropriate. I use a two-tailed test since the hypothesis is non-directional.
45
Again, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is used because Bartlett’s test for equal variances rejects the null
hypothesis of equal variances in the deflated capital expense and dividend payment variables, and thus the
parametric t-test would not be appropriate. I use a one-tailed test since the direction is predicted.
46
I cannot use the system of equations generated in Table 9 since it includes both dividend-paying firms
and non-dividend-paying firms.
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the expense of R&D investment when an incentive for only dividend payment exists (H5a). This
insignificance also prevents testing H5b directly by comparing the magnitude of change in the
coefficients. The system of simultaneous equations does yield three significant variables, the prior
year’s R&D expense (z = 2.91, p = 0.004), before-R&D MTR (z = 1.64, p = 0.100), and the
interaction between the imputation credit and the before-R&D MTR (z = -1.89, p = 0.058). When
New Zealand operates under Tax Regime I, the coefficient for the before-R&D MTR is 23321; in
Tax Regime III, it is 5900. This implies that for dividend-paying firms in Tax Regime I, where no
R&D investment or dividend payment incentives exists, the greater the MTR, the greater the
investment in R&D. However, when in Tax Regime III, firms with high MTRs do not invest as
much in R&D as they did when in Tax Regime I.
Since the before-R&D MTR variable and its interactions with dividend imputation are
significant, running the system of simultaneous equations by MTR could provide additional
information. Thus the system of simultaneous equations (12) and (13) is run on the New Zealand
dividend-paying firms after replacing the before-R&D MTR variable with a dummy variable. If a
firm has a before-R&D MTR value of the highest corporate statutory tax rate, it receives a
dummy MTR value of one. If the firm’s before-R&D MTR equals either one-half of the corporate
statutory rate or zero, it receives a dummy MTR value of zero.47 The results of running a three
stage least squares regression on the system of equations appear in Table 11.
When the sample is divided by MTR, only the prior year’s R&D expense and interactions
involving the high-MTR group are significant.48 Dividend imputation does not affect the
relationships between R&D expense and capital investment or between R&D expense and
dividend payment in low/mid-MTR, dividend-paying New Zealand firms. This demonstrates that
the effects of dividend imputation in dividend-paying firms differ according to firm MTRs. In
47

Due to the size of the sample, Stata cannot run the set of simultaneous equations if the sample is divided
into three groups (high, medium, and low-MTRs) instead of two groups (high and medium/low-MTRs)
because the low-MTR group is too small.
48
These results do not change when the system of simultaneous equations is run using the mid-MTR group
instead of the low/mid-MTR group. Again, the low-MTR group alone is too small for Stata to run.
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Tax Regime I, dividend-paying firms with higher MTRs, as compared to firms with lower MTRs,
invest significantly more in R&D as they pay more dividends (MTR*DIVPAY). However, once
in Tax Regime III, dividend-paying firms with high MTRs, as compared to firms with lower
MTRs, invest significantly less in R&D as they pay more in dividends
(MTR*IMPCRED*DIVPAY).
This is contrary to Thomas et al.’s prediction that firms operating under Tax Regime I (no
tax incentives) experience a decrease in the inverse relationship between R&D expense and
dividend payment when they move to Tax Regime III (tax incentive for dividend payment).
Further it supports the prediction in hypothesis 5b that dividend-paying firms in Tax Regime III
display a significantly greater negative relationship between R&D expense and dividend payment
when they have higher versus lower MTRs. Dividend imputation does not seem to affect firms
with lower MTRs. This finding reiterates the importance of considering firm MTRs when
evaluating tax changes and demonstrates that a policy permitting 100 percent deductibility of
R&D expenses may serve as an R&D incentive for firms with high MTRs.
The sixth hypothesis investigates corporate dividend policy views by focusing on nondividend-paying New Zealand firms operating in Tax Regime I versus Tax Regime III.49 As in
the forth hypothesis, running the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test on R&D deflated by size and
dividend payment deflated by earnings and capital investment deflated by size investigates
hypothesis 6.50 The results on all three of these runs do not indicate significant changes in any of
the variables and thus cannot support H6. Table 4, Panel B displays the predictions of the
dividend policy views. All three views predict that capital investment will increase and thus my
findings in non-dividend-paying, New Zealand firms do not support one view over another.

49

Hypothesis six corresponds to hypothesis nine which investigates non-dividend-paying firms moving
from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV (Australia from July 1988 to June 1993).
50
I run the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney since Bartlett’s test for equal variances rejects the null hypothesis of
equal variances. I use a two-tailed test when the hypothesis is non-directional and a one-tailed test when the
direction is predicted.
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The seventh and eighth hypotheses compare dividend-paying firms operating under Tax
Regime II with those operating under Tax Regime IV—Australia before and after the
implementation of dividend imputation. H7 focuses on changes in investments and dividend
payments to investigate the corporate dividend policy views; H8 investigates the relationship
between R&D expense and dividend payment.51 Running the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test on
R&D and capital investment deflated by size and dividend payment deflated by earnings
investigates the changes in these variables between the two tax regimes.52 None of these tests
detect significant changes in the medians of these variables when operating under Tax Regime II
versus Tax Regime IV. Table 3, Panel D, contains the predictions of the corporate dividend
policy views.
The tax irrelevance view predicts no changes in R&D investment, capital investment, or
dividend payment. According to the tax capitalization view, R&D investment and dividend
payment may increase. However, it also contends that the capital gains tax which was added
under Tax Regime IV will decrease the after-tax appreciation shareholders receive when they sell
their stock—increasing the cost of capital and decreasing capital investment. The double taxation
view does not provide a prediction for the change since dividend imputation and capital gains
affect the cost of capital in opposite directions. Thus when comparing the behavior of dividendpaying firms in Tax Regime II to those in Tax Regime IV, I find support for only the tax
irrelevance and double taxation views.
Running the system of simultaneous equations (12) and (13) using only Australian
dividend-paying firms in operation between July 1985 and June 1993 investigates the relationship

51

Hypotheses seven and eight correspond to hypotheses four and five which investigate dividend-paying
firms moving from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III (New Zealand before and after dividend imputation).
52
I run the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test since Bartlett’s test for equal variances rejects the null hypothesis
of equal variances, indicating the parametric t-test would not be appropriate. I use a two-tailed test when
the hypothesis is non-directional and a one-tailed test when it is directional.
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between R&D investment and dividend payment.53 Table 12 displays the results. Investigating the
interaction between the availability of dividend imputation and dividend payment
(IMPCRED*DIVPAY), reveals that dividend-paying firms exhibit a stronger (more negative)
relationship between R&D expense and dividend payment when operating under Tax Regime IV
(Australia, after super-deductibility and dividend imputation) than under Tax Regime II
(Australia, after super-deductibility and before dividend imputation). This supports H8a and
suggests that after dividend imputation, when firms pay dividends, they decrease their R&D
investment by a larger amount than they did prior to dividend imputation.
Running the system of simultaneous equations (12) and (13) on the Australian dividendpaying firms investigates the differences Australian dividend-paying firms may exhibit due to
their MTRs. A dummy variable for before-R&D MTR is included. If a firm has a before-R&D
expense value of the highest corporate statutory tax rate, it receives a dummy value of one. If the
firm’s before-R&D MTR equals either one-half of the corporate statutory rate or zero, it receives
a dummy value of zero.54 Unfortunately Stata cannot run this system of equations due to the high
collinearity between the interaction of the dummy variable indicating a high MTR and dividend
payment (MTR*DIVPAY) and the interaction of the existence of dividend imputation and
dividend payment (IMPCRED*DIVPAY).55 However, the multicollinearity between these
variables implies that it is the firms with the high-MTRs driving the negative relationship
between the interaction of the existence of dividend imputation and dividend payment
(IMPCRED*DIVPAY) in Table 12. Further, this implies that firms with higher marginal tax rates
experience a stronger (more negative) relationship when both tax incentives are available,
supporting H8b.

53

I cannot use the system of equations generated in Table 10 since it includes both Australian dividendpaying and non-dividend-paying firms in operation between July 1981 and June 1987.
54
Due to the size of the sample, Stata cannot run the set of simultaneous equations if the sample is divided
into three groups (high, medium, low) instead of two groups (high and medium/low).
55
When running a three stage least squares regression on simultaneous equations, Stata automatically drops
any variables causing multicollinearity issues.

60

The ninth hypothesis compares non-dividend-paying firms operating under Tax Regime
II with non-dividend-paying firms operating under Tax Regime IV—Australia before and after
the implementation of dividend imputation.56 Running the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test on R&D
and capital investment, deflated by size and on dividend payment deflated by earnings provides
dividend policy view evidence in this setting.57 The medians of these variables when operating
under Tax Regime II versus Tax Regime IV do not change significantly and thus do not support
hypothesis 9. Table 4, Panel D, contains the predictions of the corporate dividend policy views.
The tax capitalization and double taxation views both contend that it is plausible for these
non-dividend-paying firms to begin paying dividends. None of my non-dividend-paying firms
began paying dividends following dividend imputation’s implementation. The lack of companies
beginning to pay dividend after dividend imputation may initially seem surprising given the
recent studies of U.S. companies after an individual dividend tax rate decrease (Blouin et al.
2004, Treasury Office of Economic Policy 2003). However, these studies also find that share
repurchases, which were not common in New Zealand or Australia during my sample period,
decreased.58
H10 investigates the changes in R&D expenses, capital expenditures, and dividend
payment to see if they vary depending on the firms’ MTRs. This is tested by using the sample of
non-dividend-paying Australian tax firms with a dummy variable created for the MTR to divide
the sample into two MTR groups as in the test for H8. Neither group, low/mid-MTR or highMTR show significant changes. This finding does not support H10a, H10b or H10c.

56

Hypothesis nine corresponds to hypothesis six which investigates non-dividend-paying firms moving
from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III (New Zealand before and after dividend imputation).
57
I run the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test since Bartlett’s test for equal variances rejects the null hypothesis
of equal variances, indicating the parametric t-test is not appropriate. When the hypothesis is nondirectional, I use a two-tailed test and when it is directional, I use a one-tailed test.
58
In the United States, share repurchases could serve as an alternative use of corporate funds. A decrease in
share repurchases could increase the funds available for dividend payments, leading to the increased
dividend payments observed in these studies.

61

Tables 13 through 15 contain summaries of the hypotheses and findings. Table 13
contains the predictions and results of the first two hypotheses which investigate the relationships
among R&D investment and capital expenditures and among R&D investment and dividend
payment prior to each of the tax regime changes. The results of investigating the relationship
between R&D investment and dividend payment when the tax regime changes (hypotheses 3, 5,
and 8) are in Table 14. Table 15 shows the results of hypotheses 4, 6, 7, and 9 which investigate
the changes in tax regimes for evidence on the corporate dividend policy views.
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Chapter VIII
Conclusions and Implications
Conclusions

As shown in Table 13, in both dividend and non-dividend-paying firms, the relationship
between R&D expense and dividend payment is negative but insignificant in Tax Regime I and
Tax Regime II. The relationship between R&D expenses and capital investment is negative for
both Australian Tax Regime I and II. This implies that as Australian firms invest more in capital,
they invest less in R&D. Also summarized in Table 13, a positive relationship between R&D
expense and the before-R&D MTR exists in New Zealand’s Tax Regime I. This implies that in
this setting, firms invest more in R&D when they have higher MTRs. Again firms with higher
MTRs, receive greater benefit from any R&D expense deduction than firms with lower MTRs.
As shown in Table 14, Panel A, when Australia moves from Tax Regime I to Tax
Regime II (before and after R&D super-deductibility), the change in the relationship between
R&D expenses and dividend payment is not significant. When New Zealand moves from Tax
Regime I to Tax Regime III, the relationship between R&D expenses and dividend payment is not
significant for dividend-paying firms before or after dividend imputation (Table 14, Panel B).
Since one would most likely find the effect of dividend imputation on the relationship between
R&D investment and dividend payment in firms that pay dividends, this finding suggests that
dividend imputation does not have an effect on it.
However, as summarized in Table 14, Panel C, when these New Zealand firms are
separated by MTR, after dividend imputation’s implementation, dividend-paying firms with
higher MTRs exhibit a significantly stronger (more negative) relationship between R&D expense
and dividend payment than dividend-paying firms with lower MTRs. Thus the evidence suggests
that as dividend-paying firms with higher MTRs move from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, the
amount they invest in R&D as they pay dividends will decrease. The move between these two tax
regimes does not appear to impact dividend-paying firms with lower MTRs. This finding also
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stresses the importance of considering firms’ abilities to use tax credits and that 100 percent
deductibility for R&D expenses may serve as an R&D tax incentive for firms with high MTRs.
In dividend-paying firms operating under Tax Regime II versus Tax Regime IV, a
stronger (more negative) relationship between R&D expense and dividend payment exists when
operating under Tax Regime IV. This supports the theory that as a firm moves from Tax Regime
II, where only an R&D tax incentive exists, to Tax Regime IV, where tax incentives for both
R&D and dividend payment exist, the inverse relationship between a firm’s R&D investment and
dividend payment increases. I cannot directly test to see if this group of firms exhibits differences
in the relationship between R&D expense and dividend payment according to their MTRs,
because of multicollinearity between the high-MTR firms and dividend payment and between the
existence of dividend imputation and dividend payment. However, this multicollinearity implies
that the results in Table 12 and Panel D of Table 14 are driven by firms with high MTRs. If so,
then high-MTR firms in Tax Regime IV do display a greater increase in the negativity of the
relationship between R&D expense and dividend payment. This again demonstrates the
importance of considering firms’ tax status when predicting outcomes of changes in tax regimes.
This paper also provides insight into the dividend tax puzzle; the results of the dividend
policy view hypotheses are summarized in Table 15. When investigating the results of a tax
regime simultaneously ceasing to tax dividends at the shareholder-level and lowering corporate
tax rates, I do not find support for any of the current corporate dividend policy views (Table 15,
Panel A). I find that in dividend-paying firms, R&D investment and dividend payment change
significantly. As shown in Table 3, Panel B, all three of the corporate dividend policy views
predict an increase in capital investment. Since I do not find this, I cannot support one view over
another in this setting. When I investigate non-dividend-paying firms operation under these same
changes (Table 15, Panel B), I do not find a change in R&D investment, capital investment, nor
dividend payment and again cannot support one view over another.
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However, when investigating the results of a tax regime simultaneously ceasing to tax
dividends and implementing a capital gains tax (Table 15, Panel C), I find support for the tax
irrelevance and double taxation views in dividend-paying firms. I do not find the significant
decrease in capital investment predicted by the tax capitalization view. In non-dividend-paying
firms moving from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, I do not find significant changes in R&D
investment, capital investment, or dividend payment. All of the dividend policy views predict that
this is a plausible outcome.
Like many studies using Australian and New Zealand data, this paper is limited by the
sample size and thus lower power. The number of companies operating in these countries is small
in comparison with the United States. Further, in an effort to be able to conclude that the tax
changes of the respective country was a driving force, companies needed to be considered
domestic to be included in the sample.59 In addition, only companies in existence for a minimum
of three consecutive years were included in the sample. This was because data from the prior two
years were needed to calculate the average cash from financing variable (AVGFCF). As a result
data from as early as 1980 was needed and many of the financial databases do not carry
information that far back for Australia and New Zealand. Many efforts to increase the number of
companies were made, including hand-collecting data from financial statements housed in
Western Australia. Ideally, only companies in existence throughout the entire sample period
would have been included. However, such a requirement would have further reduced the sample
size.
Implications

This paper contributes to two areas of the literature—(1) the relationship between tax
incentives for R&D investment and dividend payment and (2) the dividend tax views. It provides
new evidence on the relationship between tax incentives for R&D investment and dividend
59

This paper defines domestic firms as those with (1) less than 50 percent of their total sales due to foreign
sales, (2) less than 50 percent of their total assets located abroad, and (3) less than 50 percent of their total
income due to foreign income.
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payment. I demonstrate that Thomas et al.’s (2003) prediction that the tension between R&D
investment and dividend payment decreases when a country previously not offering tax incentives
for R&D investment or dividend payout, implements one, does not hold in Australia or New
Zealand.60 Further I find just the opposite for New Zealand dividend-paying firms with higher
MTRs. They behave in the manner predicted for firms moving from a tax regime offering a tax
incentive for R&D investment to a tax regime offering tax incentives for both R&D investment
and dividend payment. This finding demonstrates that the relationship between tax incentives for
R&D investment and dividend payment varies according to firm MTRs and typical dividend
payment policies. It also reiterates the importance of considering firms’ abilities to use R&D tax
incentives. The results of this paper provide evidence that 100 percent deductibility for R&D
expenses serves as an R&D tax incentive for firms with higher MTRs. This implies that
researchers evaluating the success of an explicit R&D tax incentive should consider the benefit
firms were previously receiving from the 100 percent deductibility of R&D.
I also demonstrate that Thomas et al.’s (2003) prediction that the tension between R&D
investment and dividend payment increases when a country previously offering only a tax
incentives for R&D investment, offers one for both R&D investment and dividend payment,
holds in Australian, dividend-paying firms. Further, this result appears to be driven by firms with
high MTRs. This, coupled with the finding in New Zealand, demonstrates the importance of
considering the MTRs of firms when contemplating the effects a shareholder-level dividend tax
decrease will have on R&D investment.
This paper also provides new insight into the corporate dividend policy views. It finds
support for the double taxation and tax irrelevance views in dividend-paying firms operating in a
tax regime with dividend imputation and capital gains taxes. This paper also documents
significant decreases in R&D investment when a tax regime provides dividend implementation

60

The effects of moving from no incentives to one incentive were seen by investigating Australia moving
from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime II and New Zealand moving from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III.

66

but do not provide explicit incentives for R&D. This highlights a void in the current corporate
dividend policy views and shows the need for the inclusion of R&D investment. Traditionally
these views have only considered capital investment, not R&D investment. The negative
relationships between R&D expenses and capital expenditures documented in this paper
demonstrate that R&D and capital investments often move in opposite directions and that tax
changes in shareholder-level dividend taxes affect the investment in R&D.
Both managers and policymakers should also find this paper of interest. It documents that
decreases in shareholder-level dividend taxes (through dividend imputation) result in changes in
the negative relationship between dividend payment and R&D investment. Contingent on the
R&D tax incentive in place, changes in shareholder-level dividend taxes may place pressure on
firms to increase the amount of dividends paid while decreasing the amount of R&D investment.
This study found that in both New Zealand and Australia, investment in R&D decreased after the
implementation of dividend imputation.61 Further, it found that the effects of shareholder-level
dividend tax decreases vary according to the R&D tax incentive in place, the dividend policy of
the firm, and the MTR of the firm.
Decreases in investment in R&D could have a negative effect on economic growth since
research shows that domestic R&D spending is linked to the rate of innovation and the ability to
learn from others (Cameron 1996, Salter and Martin 2001). While on the surface, the payment of
dividends and R&D investment may seem unrelated, the results of this paper demonstrate this is
not true. Therefore when a decrease in shareholder-level dividend taxes designed to stimulate
economic growth is implemented, economic growth may be negated by a decrease in R&D
investment. Simply put, a decrease in shareholder-level dividend taxes serves as an incentive for
corporations to pay dividends. Hence President Bush’s statement regarding the Job and Growth
Tax Relief Act of 2003, “The bill allows for dividend income to be taxed at a lower rate. This will
encourage more companies to pay dividends.” However, as explained in this paper, company cash
61

In New Zealand this decrease was statistically significant (hypothesis 4a).
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flow is often limited and the funds to pay increased dividends must come from somewhere. In
New Zealand and Australia, much of the increased dividend funding appears to have come from
R&D investment. Thus, if a country decides to decrease shareholder-level dividend taxes and the
country values investment in R&D, it may need to consider simultaneously increasing the R&D
investment incentive.
More research is needed before the conclusions from this paper can be generalized to
countries such as the United States. This is due primarily to the fact that unlike New Zealand and
Australia during this paper’s sample period, the United States permits share repurchases. When a
country allowing share repurchases, implements a dividend payment incentive, funding for
increased dividend payments may be drawn from funds previously used for share repurchases
instead of from R&D investment funds. Therefore, future study in countries permitting share
repurchases is needed before we can generalize the results of this paper to the United States.
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Table 1
Summary of Australian and New Zealand Tax Changes
Panel A: Tax Changes in Australia (effective July 1985)
Prior to the Tax Change
Immediate deduction for
100 percent of investment

After the Tax Change
Immediate deduction for
150 percent of investment
above $20,000 AUS

Dividends Received

Taxed fully at shareholder
level

Same

Capital Gains Realized

Taxed at individual rates only
if held for less than 12
months; otherwise, no tax
applied

Same

R&D Investment

Panel B: Tax Changes in Australia (effective July 1987)

R&D Investment

Prior to the Tax Change

After the Tax Change

Immediate deduction for
150 percent of investment
above $20,000 AUS

Same

Dividends Received

Taxed fully at shareholder
level

Credit for the portion of the
dividend on which the
corporation had already paid
tax (“franked dividend”)

Capital Gains Realized

Taxed at individual rates only
if held for less than 12
months; otherwise, no tax
applied

Taxed at the individual tax
rate on the difference between
the consideration received and
the indexed cost base

Panel C: Tax Changes in New Zealand (effective April 1988)
Prior to the Tax Change

After the Tax Change

R&D Investment

Immediate deduction for
100 percent of investment

Same

Dividends Received

Taxed fully at shareholder
level

Credit for the portion of the
dividend on which the
corporation had already paid
tax

Top Corporate Tax Rate

48 percent

33 percent
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Table 2
Tax Regimes
Time
Period

R&D
Investment
Incentive

Dividend
Payment
Incentive

Tax Regime I

Australia prior to July 1985
New Zealand prior to April 1988

No

No

Tax Regime II

Australia from July 1985 to June 1987

Yes

No

Tax Regime III

New Zealand after March 1988

No

Yes

Tax Regime IV

Australia after June 1987

Yes

Yes
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Table 3
Tax Change Implications for Firms Typically Paying Dividends
Panel A: Given No Explicit Incentive for R&D Investment, the Effect of a Dividend
Imputation Credit *

Tax Irrelevance
Tax Capitalization
Double Taxation

R&D
Capital
Investment Investment
No Change No Change
No Change No Change
--------Increase

Dividend
Payment
No Change
No Change
Increase

Panel B: Given No Explicit Incentive for R&D Investment, the Effect of a Decrease in
Corporate Tax Rates*

Tax Irrelevance
Tax Capitalization
Double Taxation

R&D
Capital
Investment Investment
--------Increase
--------Increase
--------Increase

Dividend
Payment
----------------Increase

Panel C: Given an Explicit Incentive for R&D Investment, the Effect of a Dividend
Imputation Credit**

Tax Irrelevance
Tax Capitalization
Double Taxation

R&D
Capital
Investment Investment
No Change No Change
No Change No Change
--------Increase

Dividend
Payment
No Change
No Change
Increase

Panel D: Given a Dividend Imputation Credit and an Explicit Incentive for Investment in
R&D, the Effect of Capital Gains Tax on Firms**

Tax Irrelevance
Tax Capitalization
Double Taxation

R&D
Capital
Investment Investment
No Change No Change
--------Decrease
-----------------

Dividend
Payment
No Change
-----------------

--------- Indicates no prediction. According to the dividend policy view, the variable could
increase, decrease, or remain the same.
* Panel B portrays the effect of moving from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III and is tested in
hypothesis 4.
**Panel D portrays the effect of moving from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV and is tested in
hypothesis 7.
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Table 4
Tax Change Implications for Firms Not Typically Paying Dividends
Panel A: Given No Explicit Incentive for R&D Investment, the Effect of a Dividend
Imputation Credit*

Tax Irrelevance
Tax Capitalization
Double Taxation

R&D
Capital
Investment Investment
No Change No Change
No Change No Change
No Change No Change

Dividend
Payment
No Change
No Change
No Change

Panel B: Given a Dividend Imputation Credit and No Explicit Incentive for R&D
Investment, the Effect of a Decrease in Corporate Tax Rates*

Tax Irrelevance
Tax Capitalization
Double Taxation

R&D
Capital
Investment Investment
--------Increase
--------Increase
--------Increase

Dividend
Payment
No Change
No Change
No Change

Panel C: Given an Explicit Incentive for R&D Investment, the Effect of a Dividend
Imputation Credit **

Tax Irrelevance
Tax Capitalization
Double Taxation

R&D
Capital
Investment Investment
No Change No Change
No Change No Change
No Change No Change

Dividend
Payment
No Change
No Change
No Change

Panel D: Given a Dividend Imputation Credit and an Explicit Incentive for Investment in
R&D, the Effect of Lower Capital Gains Tax on Firms**

Tax Irrelevance
Tax Capitalization
Double Taxation

R&D
Capital
Investment Investment
No Change No Change
---------------------------------

Dividend
Payment
No Change
-----------------

--------- Indicates no prediction. According to the dividend policy view, the variable could
increase, decrease, or remain the same.
** Panel B portrays the effect of moving from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III and is tested in
hypothesis 6.
**Panel D portrays the effect of moving from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV and is tested in
hypothesis 9.
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Table 5
Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables—Means (Medians)
(in thousands of dollars)
New Zealand
Australia
Variable
n = 72
n = 623
RDX
1006
3432
R&D expense
(.7)
(0)
BRDMTR**
.25*
.33*
Trichotomous variable on before-R&D MTR
(.33)
(.39)
DIVPAY
9435*
34240*
Dividend payment
(4376)
(6944)
AVGOPCF
29571*
94857*
Average operating cash flows
(14491)
(26257)
AVGFCF
51122
1134
Average financing cash flows
(-454)
(-697.5)
CAPEX
27796*
85813*
Capital Expenditures
(4777)
(16201)
DEBT
.48
.50
Beginning-of-the-year debt-to-assets ratio
(.48)
(.52)
EBTR
21291
89541
Earnings before taxes and R&D expense
(12191)
(23741)
LRDX
823
3061
Lagged R&D expense
(1.15)
(0)
SIZE
11.97*
12.56*
Log of total sales
(12)
(12.55)
GPD
69212*
358470*
Gross Domestic Product
(73152)
(382497)
B/M
1.34
1.49
Book-to-Market ratio
(1.01)
(1.26)
CRATE
.36*
.42*
Statutory corporate tax rate
(.33)
(.39)
IRATE
.40*
.51*
Statutory individual tax rate
(.33)
(.49)
LDIVPAY
7677*
29892*
Lagged dividend payment
(3550)
(6552)
EGROW
.95
493.87
Growth in earnings
(.09)
(.14)
CAPRET
1.34
1.49
Return provided through price appreciation
(1.01)
(1.26)
*Variables with significant differences in the mean.
** Before-R&D marginal tax rate calculated by adding R&D expense to the taxable income and then
determining Shelvin’s (1990) trichotomous variable; Shelvin’s (1990) trichotomous variable equals the top
statutory rate if the corporation has before-R&D taxable income and no NOL carryforward, one-half of this
rate if the corporation has negative before-R&D taxable income or an NOL carryforward but not both, and
zero if the firm has negative before-R&D taxable income and an NOL carryforward;
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DIV
PAY

AVG
OPCF

AVG
FCF

CAP
EX

DEBT EBTR LRDX
RDX
BRDMTR
.08
.03
DIVPAY
.35
AVGOPCF
.57
.13
.82
.02
.01
AVGFCF
-.09
.16
CAPEX
.44
.09
.58
.70
.08
.009
DEBT
.03
-.03
.21
.17
.20
.03
EBTR
.45
.19
.66
.85
.57
.13
.03
LRDX
.93
.08
.35
.55
-.09
.43
.42
SIZE
.33
.23
.54
.58 -.001
.53
.56
.46
.33
-.03
-.05
-.05
GDP
.10
.17
.15
.11
.10
.11
B/M
.01
.07
.01
.05 -.005
.05
-.06
.06
.008
CRATE
-.03
-.02
.06
.07
.02
-.03
.35 -.06
.10
IRATE
-.002
-.02
.03
.02
.006
.001
.25 -.05
.12
IMPCRED
.05
-.05
.04
.06
.05
-.22
.13
.10
-.10
LDIVPAY
.34 .002
.87
.70
-.10
.52
.19
.46
.35
EGROW
-.002
.04
.05
.07
-.002
.08
.13
.08
.15
CAPRET
.01
.07
.01
.05 -.005
.05
-.06
.06
.008
Bold and italicized if Pearson Correlation is significant at the 5 percent level.

BRD
MTR
GDP

.12
-.24
-.09
.51
.18
.02
.12

SIZE

.003
-.005
.11
.15
-.11
.52
.10
-.005

-.08
-.08
.10
-.01
.02
.99

B/M

.73
-.65
-.08
.08
-.08

C
RATE

Table 6
Combined New Zealand and Australia—Pearson Correlation Coefficients

-.83
-.06
.01
-.08

I
RATE

.13
.02
.10

IMP
CRED

.10
-.009

LDIV
PAY

.02

E
GROW

.11
.19
.14
.07
-.23
.09
.19
.15
-.06
.38
.32
.14
-.11
.13
-.09
.38

BRD
MTR

.82
.75
.83
.24
.59
.02
.48
.09
-.09
-.07
-.08
.04
.62
.11
-09

DIV
PAY

.69
.68
.19
.73
.02
.56
.07
-.06
-.06
-.07
.007
.81
.03
-.06

AVG
OPCF

.82
.16
.45
-.02
.35
.04
-.13
-.07
-.09
.06
.61
-.03
-.13

AVG
FCF

.23
.41
.06
.37
.04
-.16
-.04
-.04
.06
.47
-.02
-.16

CAP
EX

.18
.12
.47
-.22
-.19
.19
.23
-.24
.20
.14
-.19

DEBT

Bold and italicized if Pearson Correlation is significant at the 5 percent level.

BRDMTR
DIVPAY
AVGOPCF
AVGFCF
CAPEX
DEBT
EBTR
LRDX
SIZE
GDP
B/M
CRATE
IRATE
IMPCRED
LDIVPAY
EGROW
CAPRET

RDX
.32
-.04
-.3
-.01
.03
.12
-.07
.62
.15
-.28
-.07
.33
.34
-.31
.01
-.04
-.07
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-.05
.48
-.02
.03
-.03
.04
-.14
.44
.13
.03

EBTR

.25
-.45
-.36
.46
.55
-.51
.08
-.05
-.36

LRDX

-.18
-.01
.21
.22
-.22
.48
-.01
-.01

SIZE

.20
-72
-.90
.89
.08
-.24
.20

GDP

Table 7
New Zealand—Pearson Correlation Coefficients

-.19
-.20
.19
-.10
-.02
.99

B/M

.86
-.75
-.06
.08
-.19

C
RATE

-.93
-.07
.11
-.20

I
RATE

.04
-.17
.19

IMP
CRED

-.05
-.10

LDIV
PAY

-.02

E
GROW

DIV
PAY

AVG
OPCF

AVG
FCF

CAP
EX

DEBT EBTR LRDX
RDX
BRDMTR
.06
.01
DIVPAY
.35
AVGOPCF
.57
.11
.82
.02 .009
AVGFCF
-.09
.16
.07
.07
CAPEX
.44
.57
.70
.01
DEBT
.03
-.01
.21
.17
.20
.03
EBTR
.44
.18
.66
.85
.57
.13
LRDX
.06
.03
.93
.34
.55
-.09
.43
.41
SIZE
.34
.23
.55
.58 -.007
.54
.57
.46
.33
-.06
.04
.05
.08
GDP
.08
-.26
.13
.10
-.11
B/M
.01
.05
.01
.05 -.003
.05
-.05
.06
.01
CRATE
-.06
-.06
.07
.04
-.009
-.06
.32 -.11
.08
IRATE
-.07
.06 -.05
-.06
-.07
.23 -.14
-.11
.10
IMPCRED
.06
-.05
.05
.07
.06
-.22
.14
.11
-.08
LDIVPAY
-.02
.34
.87
.70
-.11
.53
.19
.45
.34
EGROW
-.005
.03
.08
.05
.07
-.01
.12
.08
.15
CAPRET
.01
.05
.01
.05 -.00.
.05
-.05
.06
.01
Bold and italicized if Pearson Correlation is significant at the 5 percent level.

BRD
MTR
GDP

.14
-.79
-.95
.89
.15
-.02
.14

SIZE

-.11
-.01
.07
.11
-.10
.53
.11
-.008

Table 8
Australia—Pearson Correlation Coefficients

-.09
-.11
.09
-.01
.01
.99

B/M

.69
-.66
-.13
.07
-.09

C
RATE

-.98
-.15
-.01
-.11

I
RATE

.15
.02
.09

IMP
CRED

.10
-.01

LDIV
PAY

.01

E
GROW

Table 9
Results for Simultaneous Regression Estimation in New Zealand Firms
Moving from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III
Variable
BRDMTR
Before R&D marginal tax rate
DIVPAY
Dividend payment
AVGOPCF
Average operating cash flows
AVGFCF
Average financing cash flows
CAPEX
Capital Expenditures
DEBT
Beginning-of-the-year debt-to-assets ratio
EBTR
Earnings before taxes and R&D expense
LRDX
Lagged R&D expense
SIZE
Log of total sales
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
B/M
Book-to-Market ratio
CRATE
Statutory corporate tax rate
IRATE
Statutory individual tax rate
IMPCRED
Dummy measure equal to 1 if dividend imputation exists
IMPCRED*BRDMTR
Interaction between dividend imputation and before-R&D MTR
IMPCRED*DIVPAY
Interaction between dividend imputation and dividend payment
IMPCRED*CAPEX
Interaction between dividend imputation and capital expenditures
RDX
R&D Expense
LDIVPAY
Lagged dividend payment
EGROW
Growth in earnings
CAPRET
Return provided through price appreciation
z-statistics are in parentheses.
*,**,*** Denote 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
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RDX
R&D
Expense
12284
(2.50)**
-.0525
(-0.01)
-.0021
(-0.07)
-.0004
(-0.18)
-.0327
(-0.03)
920
(0.18)
.0096
(0.10)
.9878
(3.28)***
-32.16
(-0.18)
-.0222
(-0.04)
100
(0.08)
4065
(0.47)
-4852
(-0.11)
2541
(0.22)
-10183
(-1.86)*
.0119
(0.00)
.0404
(0.04)

DIVPAY
Dividend
payment
5000
(0.47)
.0847
(1.99)
-.0022
(-0.32)
.1399
(5.07)***
1505
(0.32)
.0163
(0.55)
458
(0.63)

-175
(-0.01)
-18283
(-0.68)
-3958
(-0.63)

-.5224
(-0.66)
.0566
(0.46)
385
(2.05)***
100
(0.10)

Table 10
Results for Simultaneous Regression Estimation in Australian Firms
Moving from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime II
Variable
BRDMTR
Before R&D marginal tax rate
DIVPAY
Dividend payment
AVGOPCF
Average operating cash flows
AVGFCF
Average financing cash flows
CAPEX
Capital Expenditures
DEBT
Beginning-of-the-year debt-to-assets ratio
EBTR
Earnings before taxes and R&D expense
LRDX
Lagged R&D expense
SIZE
Log of total sales
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
B/M
Book-to-Market ratio
CRATE
Statutory corporate tax rate
R&DINCENT
Dummy measure equal to 1 if super-deductibility exists
R&DINCENT*BRDMTR
Interaction between super-deductibility and before-R&D MTR
R&DINCENT*DIVPAY
Interaction between super-deductibility and dividend payment
R&DINCENT*CAPEX
Interaction between super-deductibility and capital expenditures
RDX
R&D Expense
LDIVPAY
Lagged dividend payment
EGROW
Growth in earnings
CAPRET
Return provided through price appreciation
z-statistics are in parentheses.
*,**,*** Denote 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
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R&D
Expense
-848
(-0.79)
-.0059
(-0.13)
.0152
(3.70)***
-.0006
(-1.34)
-.0104
(-2.54)**
-895
(-1.17)
-.0048
(-1.00)
1.14
(50.53)***
43.77
(0.43)
-.0008
(-0.14)
10.40
(0.15)
5214
(0.46)
-863
(-1.37)
1222
(0.81)
-.0095
(-0.28)
.0103
(2.42)**

Dividend
payment
1976
(0.29)
.1030
(2.56)**
-.0079
(-1.96)
.2036
(3.03)***
-12066
(-1.88)*
.0879
(2.95)***
801
(0.89)

-9501
(-0.10)
549
(0.22)

-.5794
(-4.10)***
.2517
(5.26)***
-1.21
(-1.61)*
520
(0.75)

Table 11
Results for Simultaneous Regression Estimation in New Zealand Dividend-Paying
Firms Moving from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, Separated by MTR
Variable
DIVPAY
Dividend payment
AVGOPCF
Average operating cash flows
AVGFCF
Average financing cash flows
CAPEX
Capital Expenditures
DEBT
Beginning-of-the-year debt-to-assets ratio
EBTR
Earnings before taxes and R&D expense
LRDX
Lagged R&D expense
SIZE
Log of total sales
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
B/M
Book-to-Market ratio
CRATE
Statutory corporate tax rate
IRATE
Statutory individual tax rate
IMPCRED
Dummy measure equal to 1 if dividend imputation exists
MTR
Dummy measure equal to 1 if before-R&D MTR is highest corporate tax rate
IMPCRED*MTR
Interaction between dividend imputation and MTR
IMPCRED*DIVPAY
Interaction between dividend imputation and dividend payment
IMPCRED*CAPEX
Interaction between dividend imputation and capital expenditures
MTR*DIVPAY
Interaction between MTR and dividend payment
MTR*CAPEX
Interaction between MTR and capital expenditures
MTR*IMPCRED*DIVPAY
Interaction among MTR, dividend imputation, and dividend payment
MTR*IMPCRED*CAPEX
Interaction among MTR, dividend imputation, and capital expenditures
RDX
R&D Expense
LDIVPAY
Lagged dividend payment
EGROW
Growth in earnings
CAPRET
Return provided through price appreciation

R&D
Expense
.4648
(0.61)
-.0144
(-1.40)
-.0011
(-0.69)
-0922
(-0.70)
-2002
(-0.92)
.0027
(0.09)
.9184
(3.16)***
-127
(-0.32)
-.1909
(-0.89)
164
(0.41)
658
(0.07)
-10910
(-1.00)
5657
(0.66)
-866
(-0.41)
651
(0.28)
-.4001
(-0.55)
.0880
(0.64)
2.85
(2.65)***
-.7672
(-2.17)**
-2.72
(-2.71)***
.7447
(2.14)**

z-statistics are in parentheses; *,**,*** Denote 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.

87

Dividend
payment
.0196
(0.40)
-.0123
(-1.75)*
.2031
(6.48)***
7442
(1.47)
.0617
(1.79)*
-1430
(-1.04)

15903
(0.49)
-38366
(-1.22)
-2836
(-0.38)
-2279
(-0.78)

.9694
(1.27)
.2451
(1.81)*
608
(3.14)***
492
(0.44)

Table 12
Results for Simultaneous Regression Estimation in Australian Dividend-Paying Firms
Moving from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV
Variable
BRDMTR
Before R&D marginal tax rate
DIVPAY
Dividend payment
AVGOPCF
Average operating cash flows
AVGFCF
Average financing cash flows
CAPEX
Capital Expenditures
DEBT
Beginning-of-the-year debt-to-assets ratio
EBTR
Earnings before taxes and R&D expense
LRDX
Lagged R&D expense
SIZE
Log of total sales
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
B/M
Book-to-Market ratio
CRATE
Statutory corporate tax rate
IRATE
Statutory individual tax rate
IMPCRED
Dummy measure equal to 1 if dividend imputation exists
IMPCRED*BRDMTR
Interaction between dividend imputation and before-R&D MTR
IMPCRED*DIVPAY
Interaction between dividend imputation and dividend payment
IMPCRED*CAPEX
Interaction between dividend imputation and capital expenditures
RDX
R&D Expense
LDIVPAY
Lagged dividend payment
EGROW
Growth in earnings
CAPRET
Return provided through price appreciation
z-statistics are in parentheses.
*,**,*** Denote 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
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R&D
Expense
-3738
(-0.71)
.1303
(1.59)
.0104
(2.04)**
-.0004
(-2.08)**
-.0089
(-1.59)
-203
(-0.14)
-.0002
(-0.10)
.9291
(30.94)***
-216
(-0.87)
.1205
(2.58)***
-198
(-0.83)
51980
(2.31)**
218567
(2.71)***
14196
(2.55)**
2841
(0.48)
-.1487
(-1.93)**
.0140
(1.91)*

Dividend
payment
-30405
(-2.07)**
.1140
(4.31)***
.0011
(0.82)
-.0133
(-1.20)
10432
(1.17)
.0635
(4.76)***
48.27
(0.03)

-11882
(-0.30)
332387
(2.14)**
34223
(2.18)**

-.8821
(-4.89)***
.7249
(19.77)***
-1.04
(-3.16)***
426
(0.28)

Table 13
Initial Relationships in Tax Regimes I and II
Tax Regime I
New Zealand Firms Prior to April 1988

H1a
H1b
H2

Relationship Between
R&D Investment and
Capital Investment
R&D Investment and
Dividend Payment
R&D Investment and
Before-R&D MTR

Sample
Size
16

Statistical
Test
Simultaneous
Regression
Simultaneous
Regression
Simultaneous
Regression

16
16

Predicted
Sign
-

Finding
Insignificant

-

Insignificant

+

+

Predicted
Sign
-

Finding
-

-

Insignificant

+

Insignificant

Tax Regime I
Australian Firms Prior to June 1985

H1a
H1b
H2

Relationship Between
R&D Investment and
Capital Investment
R&D Investment and
Dividend Payment
R&D Investment and
Before-R&D MTR

Sample
Size
106

Statistical
Test
Simultaneous
Regression
Simultaneous
Regression
Simultaneous
Regression

106
106

Tax Regime II
Australian Firms from July 1985 to June 1987

H1a
H1b
H2

Relationship Between
R&D Investment and
Capital Investment
R&D Investment and
Dividend Payment
R&D Investment and
Before-R&D MTR

Sample
Size
86

Statistical
Test
Simultaneous
Regression
Simultaneous
Regression
Simultaneous
Regression

86
86

89

Predicted
Sign
-

Finding
-

-

Insignificant

+

Insignificant

Table 14
Changes in the Relationship between R&D Investment and
Dividend Payment when Moving Tax Regimes
Panel A: Dividend-Paying Firms Moving from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime II
H3

Relationship between
R&D Investment and
Dividend Payment

Prediction
Weaker Relationship

Finding
Insignificant

Panel B: Dividend-Paying Firms Moving from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III
H5a

Relationship between
R&D Investment and
Dividend Payment

Prediction
Weaker Relationship

Finding
Insignificant

Panel C: Dividend-Paying Firms Moving from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, Separated
by MTR

H5b

Relationship between

Prediction

R&D Investment and
Dividend Payment

Weakening of Relationship Is
Greater in Low/Mid-MTRs

Finding
High
Low/Mid
MTRs
MTRs
Negativity Insignificant
Increases

Panel D: Dividend-Paying Firms Moving from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV
H8a

Relationship between
R&D Investment and
Dividend Payment

Prediction
Stronger
Relationship

Finding
Stronger
Relationship

Panel E: Dividend-Paying Firms Moving from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, Separated
by MTR
H8b

Relationship between
R&D Investment and
Dividend Payment

Prediction
Increase in the Strength of the
Relationship is Greater in HighMTRs

Finding**
Cannot Test Directly Due
to Multi-Collinearity

** The high collinearity between the interaction of dividend imputation and dividend payment
and the interaction of the high-MTR group and dividend payment implies that the high-MTR
group drives the result in H8a. H8a finds a stronger relationship between R&D expense and
dividend payment after dividend imputation. If this finding is driven by the high-MTR group, it
supports H8b.
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Table 15
Changes in R&D Investment, Capital Investment, and Dividend Payment
When Moving Tax Regimes
Panel A: Dividend-Paying Firms Moving from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III
H4a
H4b
H4c

Change in
R&D Investment
Capital Investment
Dividend Payment

Prediction
Change
Increase
Increase

Finding
Decrease
Insignificant
Increase

Panel B: Non-Dividend-Paying Firms Moving from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III
H6a
H6b
H6c

Change in
R&D Investment
Capital Investment
Dividend Payment

Prediction
Change
Increase
Change

Finding
Insignificant
Insignificant
Insignificant

Panel C: Dividend-Paying Firms Moving from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV
H7a
H7b
H7c

Change in
R&D Investment
Capital Investment
Dividend Payment

Prediction
Change
Increase
Increase

Finding
Insignificant
Insignificant
Insignificant

Panel D: Non-Dividend-Paying Firms Moving from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV
H9a
H9b
H9c

Change in
R&D Investment
Capital Investment
Dividend Payment

Prediction
Change
Increase
Increase
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Finding
Insignificant
Insignificant
Insignificant

